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Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable 
JILL E. FISCH* 
Sustainability is receiving increasing attention from issuers, invest-
ors, and regulators. The desire to understand issuer sustainability 
practices and their relationship to economic performance has resulted 
in a proliferation of sustainability disclosure regimes and standards. 
The range of approaches to disclosure, however, limits the compara-
bility and reliability of the information disclosed. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC)’s longstanding policy that sustainability 
is not properly part of financial disclosure has contributed to the cur-
rent regime. Although the SEC has solicited comment on whether to 
reverse this policy and require expanded sustainability disclosures in 
issuers’ periodic financial reporting, and investors have communicated 
broad-based support for such expanded disclosures, the SEC to date 
still has not required general sustainability disclosure. 
This Article argues that claims about the relationship between 
issuer sustainability practices and risk management, business plans, 
and economic vulnerability warrant incorporating sustainability infor-
mation into SEC-mandated financial reporting. Perhaps even more im-
portant, in light of the growing pressure for issuers to adopt sustainable 
business practices and the responsiveness of many issuers to this pres-
sure, is the need for issuers, investors, and regulators to obtain the in-
formation necessary to evaluate claims about the economic impact of 
sustainability initiatives. 
Drawing upon the existing narrative disclosure frameworks in 
SEC-mandated reporting requirements, this Article offers an innovative 
proposal for sustainability disclosure—a sustainability discussion and 
analysis, or “SD&A,” section of the annual report. This Article identi-
fies the critical components necessary to make mandated sustainability 
disclosure both practical and cost-effective and offers a workable first 
step for integrating sustainability disclosure into issuer financial 
reporting.   
*  Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Business Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In January 2018, Larry Fink, CEO of BlackRock, made headlines when he 
called upon corporations to pay greater attention to sustainability and societal 
impact in his annual letter to CEOs.1 
See, e.g., Sarah Krouse, BlackRock CEO to Companies: Pay Attention to ‘Societal Impact,’ WALL 
ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2018, 3:11 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/blackrock-ceo-to-companies-pay- 
attention-to-societal-impact-1516120840 [https://perma.cc/QEY5-YKPH] (reporting Fink’s letter); 
Andrew Ross Sorkin, BlackRock’s Message: Contribute to Society, or Risk Losing Our Support, N.Y. 
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/15/business/dealbook/blackrock- 
laurence-fink-letter.html [https://nyti.ms/2FHQonI] (same). 
As Fink explained, “[A] company’s ability 
to manage environmental, social, and governance matters demonstrates the lead-
ership and good governance that is so essential to sustainable growth, which is 
1. 
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why we are increasingly integrating these issues into our investment process.”2 
Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s Annual Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose, BLACKROCK, 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/YA6G- 
5ZKE] (last visited Mar. 7, 2019). 
One reporter termed the letter “a watershed moment on Wall Street.”3 
Fink’s letter was a high-profile example of a leading institutional investor 
expressing concern about corporate sustainability, but it was not an isolated 
occurrence. Investor focus on sustainability is accelerating.4 
See, e.g., GREGORY UNRUH ET AL., MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV., INVESTING FOR A SUSTAINABLE 
FUTURE: FINDINGS FROM THE 2016 SUSTAINABILITY GLOBAL EXECUTIVE STUDY AND RESEARCH PROJECT 
3 (2016), http://marketing.mitsmr.com/offers/SU2016/57480-MITSMR-BCG-Sustainability2016.pdf? 
utm_source=WhatCounts%2cþPublicasterþEdition&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=surpt16& 
utm_content=DownloadþtheþReportþ(PDF)&cid=1 [https://perma.cc/9SD6-TC5E] (“[A] growing 
number of investors are paying attention to ESG performance, as evidence mounts that sustainability- 
related activities are material to the financial success of a company over time.”). 
Even Martin Lipton 
has acknowledged that “sustainability has become a major, mainstream gover-
nance topic.”5 
Martin Lipton, Spotlight on Boards 2018, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. 
(May 31, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/05/31/spotlight-on-boards-2018/ [https://perma. 
cc/J4H2-4ZF7]. Sustainable investing has even been embraced by several activist hedge funds such as 
Jana and Trian. See Charles M. Nathan, On Governance: ESG Investing Takes on New Meaning for 
Activist Hedge Funds and Corporate Boards, CONF. BD. (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.conference-board. 
org/blog/postdetail.cfm?post=6697 [https://perma.cc/XGF4-6JK2] (exploring and critically evaluating 
the ESG strategies of Trian Partners and Jana Partners). 
The debate over sustainability is leading investors, executives, and 
directors to rethink how corporations engage in long-term value creation.6 
The extent to which corporations should incorporate sustainability objectives 
into their operational decisionmaking is highly contested, as is the relationship 
between societal impact and economic value.7 Indeed, the Department of 
Labor subsequently issued new guidelines for retirement plans cautioning that 
“[f]iduciaries must not too readily treat ESG factors as economically relevant to 
the particular investment choices at issue when making a decision.”8 
John J. Canary, Field Assistance Bulletin No. 2018-01, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Apr. 23, 2018), 
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/employers-and-advisers/guidance/field-assistance-bulletins/2018-01 
[https://perma.cc/RDZ9-9SBU]. 
At the same 
time, however, issuers are modifying their operations in response both to investor 
demands and to the claim that sustainable business practices lead to improved 
economic performance.9 
See, e.g., KPMG, ESG, STRATEGY, AND THE LONG VIEW: A FRAMEWORK FOR BOARD OVERSIGHT 
7 (2017), https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/lu/pdf/lu-en-esg-strategy-framework-for-board- 
oversight.pdf (“Some of the largest U.S. corporations are publicly emphasizing the strategic importance 
of ESG to their businesses . . . .”); The UN Global Compact—Accenture Strategy CEO Study, 
Being able to assess an issuer’s sustainability  
2. 
3. Sorkin, supra note 1. 
4. 
5. 
6. See UNRUH ET AL., supra note 4, at 7 (reporting survey results indicating that “more than 80% of 
investor respondents indicate that good sustainability performance increases a company’s potential for 
long-term value creation”). 
7. See, e.g., Robert G. Eccles, Ioannis Ioannou & George Serafeim, The Impact of Corporate 
Sustainability on Organizational Processes and Performance, 60 MGMT. SCI. 2835, 2836 (2014) 
(describing study finding that companies which voluntarily adopted sustainability policies by 1993 
outperformed their counterparts over the long term). 
8. 
9. 
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ACCENTURE (2016), https://www.accenture.com/us-en/insight-un-global-compact-ceo-study [https:// 
perma.cc/39W3-MHMN] (“Eighty-five percent of CEOs say they have embedded sustainability into the 
business even where they cannot quantify the benefits.”). 
10. “Thousands of companies around the world, including 95 percent of the Global Fortune 250, 
voluntarily report on their environmental, societal, and economic impacts.” Adam Sulkowski & Sandra 
Waddock, Beyond Sustainability Reporting: Integrated Reporting Is Practiced, Required and More 
Would Be Better, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1060, 1061 (2013). 
11. 
practices is critical to evaluating the effect of sustainability practices on economic 
value. For investors and capital markets to consider the societal impact of a firm’s 
operations—and to determine the consequences of that impact—they must have 
access to adequate sustainability disclosure. 
Therein lies the problem. Although the focus on increasing sustainability dis-
closure is accelerating both in the United States and globally,10 investors continue 
to report dissatisfaction with existing disclosures.11 
For example, a 2014 PWC survey reported levels of investor dissatisfaction with existing 
sustainability disclosures ranging from thirty-eight percent in Europe to sixty-one percent in the United 
States and as high as eighty-three percent in the Middle East and North Africa. PWC, SUSTAINABILITY 
GOES MAINSTREAM: INSIGHTS INTO INVESTOR VIEWS 7 (2014), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/pwc- 
investor-resource-institute/publications/assets/pwc-sustainability-goes-mainstream-investor-views.pdf. 
Michael Bloomberg, who chairs the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, stated in 2015 that “for 
the most part, the sustainability information that is disclosed by corporations today is not useful for 
investors or other decision-makers.” Bloomberg, IMPACT REPORT UPDATE 2015, at 2 (2016), https:// 
data.bloomberglp.com/company/sites/39/2018/03/Impact_Report_2015.pdf. 
Recognizing this dissatisfac-
tion, the SEC has raised the question of whether it should require increased sus-
tainability disclosure as part of its “Disclosure Effectiveness Initiative.”12 
See, e.g., Rick A. Fleming, Investor Advocate, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Moving Forward 
with the Commission’s Disclosure Effectiveness Initiative, Speech at the NASAA Corporation Finance 
Training, Houston, Texas (Nov. 19, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/moving-forward-with-the- 
disclosure-effectiveness-initiative.html [https://perma.cc/6TNH-N8X5] (describing the initiative as 
partially a response to legislation ordering the SEC to revise Regulation S–K but explaining that the 
initiative is “broader in its objectives and scope”). The SEC issued a staff report on the effectiveness of 
the disclosure requirements in Regulation S–K in December 2013. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT 
ON REVIEW OF DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN REGULATION S–K (2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/ 
studies/2013/reg-sk-disclosure-requirements-review.pdf. In April 2016, the SEC issued a concept 
release on disclosure effectiveness, which, in part, invited comment on the extent to which SEC rules 
should mandate sustainability disclosure. Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation 
S–K, Securities Act Release No. 10,064, Exchange Act Release No. 77,599, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,916 
(proposed Apr. 22, 2016). 
The 
SEC received thousands of responses urging it to do so.13 
See generally TYLER GELLASCH, AFL–CIO ET AL., TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE ECONOMY: A 
REVIEW OF COMMENTS TO THE SEC’S DISCLOSURE EFFECTIVENESS CONCEPT RELEASE (2016), https:// 
www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/sustainableeconomyreport.pdf (summarizing responses to the SEC’s 
Concept Release on Disclosure Effectiveness). 
Investors continue to 
request the SEC to “initiate rulemaking to develop mandatory rules for public 
companies to disclose high-quality, comparable, decision-useful environmental, 
social, and governance information.”14 
Cynthia A. Williams & Jill E. Fisch, Request for Rulemaking on Environmental, Social, and 
Governance (ESG) Disclosure, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N 16 (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/ 
rules/petitions/2018/petn4-730.pdf [hereinafter Petition for Rulemaking]. 
One reason for concern with current disclosure practices is that most existing 
sustainability reporting is voluntary, which means that individual issuers choose 
12. 
13. 
14. 
926 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 107:923 
which information to disclose. The resulting lack of standardization means that 
issuer disclosures vary substantially, which impedes comparability.15 
By way of example, both General Motors and Ford provide differing information on the same 
topic: their respective electric vehicle developments. General Motors describes the number of electric 
vehicles it intends to bring to market by 2023 and the number of miles driven in its electric vehicles. See 
2017 Sustainability Report: 2017 Highlights, GEN. MOTORS, https://www.gmsustainability.com/aspire/ 
highlights.html [https://perma.cc/C9QU-GTR6] (last visited Sept. 10, 2018). Ford reports on the number 
of hybrid and fully-electric vehicles it intends to bring to market by 2022, the size of its investment in 
electric vehicles, and the progress of several specific global partnerships on electrified vehicles. See 
Sustainability Report 2017/18: Scaling Up Electrification, FORD, https://corporate.ford.com/microsites/ 
sustainability-report-2017-18/driving-change/electrification.html [https://perma.cc/QN7M-UWPQ] 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2019). 
A second 
concern is that sustainability reporting is typically characterized as “non-financial” 
reporting16 
NASDAQ, ESG REPORTING GUIDE: A SUPPORT PROGRAM FOR NASDAQ ISSUERS FOCUS AREA: 
NORDIC & BALTIC MARKETS 10 (2017), http://business.nasdaq.com/media/ESG-Reporting-Guide_ 
tcm5044-41395.pdf. 
and is distinct in location, format, and rigor from other investor- 
oriented information. Finally, sustainability reporting varies widely in quality, and 
its accuracy is rarely audited or monitored, reducing its effectiveness as a tool for 
improving accountability.17 
See Patrick Odier, Why Lack of Data is the Biggest Hazard in ‘Green Investing,’ FIN. TIMES 
(Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/be8e5db2-0249-11e7-aa5b-6bb07f5c8e12 [https://perma.cc/ 
5NB5-U55D] (“[D]ata on the real-world impact that companies exert is poor, incomplete, non- 
standardised, or inaccessible.”). 
These limitations impede the ability of investors and researchers to evaluate 
the sustainability practices of issuers and to analyze the relationship between sus-
tainable practices and economic performance. Investors are demanding greater 
sustainability, and issuers are responding to these demands, without reliable evi-
dence of sustainability’s economic impact. One possible solution is to continue 
the reliance on private ordering but seek common standards to facilitate compara-
bility.18 
For example, the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) has been engaged in a 
multi-year project, in conjunction with issuers and investors, to develop common standards for 
disclosure of material sustainability information. See generally Standards Overview, SASB, https:// 
www.sasb.org/standards-overview/ [https://perma.cc/BEP2-E5R7] (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) 
(describing the development of the SASB’s sustainability standards). 
A variety of standard setters are assisting in the process by developing 
and publishing sustainability metrics, ratings, and guidelines.19 
Elisse B. Walter, The Future of Sustainability Disclosure: What Remains Unchanged in an 
Environment of Regulatory Uncertainty?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 
7, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/12/07/the-future-of-sustainability-disclosure-what-remains- 
unchanged-in-an-environment-of-regulatory-uncertainty/ [https://perma.cc/QBH9-TWB6]. 
This variety is 
itself a problem, in that it increases search costs for investors and makes it chal-
lenging to compare information from different providers.20 
See, e.g., Charles E. Merrill, The SEC Revisits Sustainability: Will Sustainability Reporting 
Become Mandatory for Publicly-Traded U.S. Corporations?, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 7, 2016), https://www. 
lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8148a821-b3d0-4e23-b7de-55b06f9ed7da [https://perma.cc/UZA4- 
YFRU] (“[T]he current patchwork of ESG reporting methods does not make such information readily 
accessible.”). 
The quality of third- 
party information is diminished because most standard setters rely on information 
voluntarily supplied by issuers, either directly to the standard setter or through 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
2019] MAKING SUSTAINABILITY DISCLOSURE SUSTAINABLE 927 
public disclosures. In addition, to the extent that standard setters use proprietary 
methodologies or information that is not publicly available, the significance of 
their ratings is not transparent and is difficult to evaluate. 
Another option is mandatory sustainability disclosure. Several jurisdictions 
have imposed or are considering imposing mandatory disclosure requirements 
related to specific sustainability issues.21 One example of the move toward man-
datory sustainability disclosure is the 2014 European Union (EU) Directive on 
the Disclosure of Non-Financial and Diversity Information, which required cer-
tain issuers to begin providing specific sustainability disclosures in 2018.22 
Directive 2014/95, of the European Parliament and of the Council of Oct. 22, 2014, art. 1, 2014 
O.J. (L 330/1) 1, 5 (EU). The Directive requires non-financial reporting by 1) large companies, 2) 
“public-interest” entities, and 3) companies with more than 500 employees per year, on average. CSR 
EUR. & GRI, MEMBER STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVE 2014/95/EU, at 8 (2017), https://www. 
globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/NFRpublication%20online_version.pdf (explaining these criteria). 
Because the Directive is implemented at the country level, different countries have adopted varying 
criteria with respect to its application. For example, the Danish regulation redefines “large company” to 
include, inter alia, companies with an average of 250 employees. Innovative Implementation of EU 
Directive on Non-Financial Reporting, GRI (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.globalreporting.org/ 
information/news-and-press-center/Pages/EU-Directive-on-Non-Financial-Reporting.aspx [https://perma. 
cc/QQ72-U539]. In contrast, the Greek legislation imposes a duty to report on companies of all sizes. Id. 
Commentators in the United States have repeatedly called upon the SEC to do 
more to formalize sustainability disclosure.23 
See, e.g., Heather Slavkin Corzo, Dir., Office of Inv., AFL–CIO, Comment Letter on Concept 
Release Regarding Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S–K (July 21, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-305.pdf (“[G]iven the clear and growing demand from 
investors for environmental, social and governance (‘ESG’) information, the Commission must begin 
requiring ESG related line-item disclosures as well as a process to incorporate emerging ESG metrics 
into disclosure in the future.”); Che Odom, Investors Want Sustainability Disclosures in SEC Overhaul, 
BLOOMBERG (July 21, 2016), https://www.bna.com/investors-sustainability-disclosures-n73014445099/ 
[https://perma.cc/8AB2-LTH7] (“Investor advocates are making a strong push for the SEC to require 
annual, uniform sustainability reporting from public companies as part of the overhaul of the agency’s 
disclosure regime.”). 
The incorporation of sustainability 
reporting into the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws faces 
obvious political obstacles, particularly under a presidential administration that 
publicly embraces a deregulatory approach.24 
The Trump administration and the Republican Congress announced their intention to reduce or repeal 
existing disclosure requirements such as for resource extraction and conflict minerals. See Financial Choice 
Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. § 862(a) (Discussion Draft 2017), https://financialservices.house.gov/ 
uploadedfiles/choice_2.0_discussion_draft.pdf (proposing a repeal of sections 1502–06 of the Dodd–Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213–22 (2010) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.), relating to “[c]onflict minerals,” “[r]eporting 
requirements regarding coal or other mine safety,” “[d]isclosure of payments by resource extraction issuers,” 
“[s]tudy by the Comptroller General,” and “[s]tudy on core deposits and brokered deposits”); Press Release, 
Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Statement of Administration Policy on Substitute 
Amendment to H.R. 10 – Financial CHOICE Act of 2017 (June 6, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
whitehouse.gov/files/briefing-room/presidential-actions/related-omb-material/saphr10h_20170606.pdf 
(expressing the Trump administration’s support for the Financial CHOICE Act of 2017 bill). 
Apart from the political obstacles, 
however, there are concerns about the practicability of developing a workable 
structure for mandatory disclosure. Sustainability disclosures must be specific 
enough to provide investors and capital markets with meaningful and readily 
21. See infra notes 114–17 and accompanying text. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
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comparable information. At the same time, relevant sustainability issues vary 
substantially by issuer and industry, making a detailed line-item approach less 
feasible.25 
This problem is not insurmountable. Some sustainability issues are arguably common to all firms. 
See Douglas Hoffner, Interim Chief Exec. Officer, Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., Comment Letter on 
Concept Release on Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S–K (July 21, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-267.pdf (citing gender diversity and the impact of 
climate change as examples). The SASB has responded to this variation by developing seventy-nine 
industry-specific standards. See Standards Overview, supra note 18. 
The alternative, a principles-based approach, complicates policing the 
accuracy of issuer disclosures and risks producing low-quality or boilerplate 
disclosures.26 
This Article proposes a solution—mandating a “Sustainability Discussion and 
Analysis” (SD&A) as part of an issuer’s annual report to shareholders.27 The 
SD&A would be modeled after existing Management Discussion and Analysis 
(MD&A) and Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) and would reflect 
a similar principles-based approach to those provisions, requiring issuers to 
address those sustainability issues most important to their operations.28 
This Article proposes that the SD&A require an issuer to disclose, at a mini-
mum, the three sustainability issues that are most significant for the firm’s opera-
tions, to explain the basis for that selection, and to explain the impact of those 
issues on firm performance. The SD&A would centralize sustainability disclo-
sures within an issuer’s securities filings. As with the MD&A and CD&A require-
ments, implementing the SD&A would require that the SEC issue guidance by 
identifying sustainability issues that are likely to be material to investors and 
articulating the principles that issuers should apply in preparing their SD&As.29 
25. 
26. See generally Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities 
Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 6–7 (2008) (explaining the difference between a principles-based 
approach and a rules-based approach and observing that a principles-based approach entails greater 
flexibility but at the cost of increased uncertainty). 
27. The formal requirement would be reflected by including the SD&A as part of Regulation S–K. 
The SEC adopted the regulation in 1980 to centralize the disclosure requirements of the Securities Act 
of 1933 (which apply to public offerings) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (which impose 
periodic reporting requirements on public companies). See John C. Coffee, Jr., Re-Engineering 
Corporate Disclosure: The Coming Debate Over Company Registration, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1143, 1145 (1995) (describing the widespread criticism of the “pointless duplication” in disclosure rules 
prior to Regulation S–K). The disclosures required by Regulation S–K apply to various securities filings, 
including registration statements and annual reports. See 1 Cristopher Greer et al., FEDERAL SECURITIES 
ACT OF 1933 § 7.03, LEXIS (database updated 2018) (“The nonfinancial substantive disclosure 
provisions of Form S-1 rely entirely on the provisions of Regulation S-K and include essentially the 
same information about the registrant as that required to be reported in an annual report to the 
Commission filed on Exchange Act Form 10-K.” (footnote omitted)). 
28. See, e.g., Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S–K, Securities Act Release 
No. 10,064, Exchange Act Release No. 77,599, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,916, 23,925 (proposed Apr. 22, 2016) 
(“Many of our rules require disclosure when information is material to investors. These rules rely on a 
registrant’s management to evaluate the significance of information in the context of the registrant’s 
overall business and financial circumstances and determine whether disclosure is necessary. The 
requirements are often referred to as ‘principles-based’ because they articulate a disclosure objective 
and look to management to exercise judgment in satisfying that objective.” (footnotes omitted)). 
29. See generally id. at 23,924–26 (summarizing the rules’ disclosure requirements regarding 
material information). 
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The SD&A would place responsibility for drafting such disclosures on the per-
sonnel who prepare the issuer’s financial reporting. It would subject sustainability 
disclosure to the same regulatory framework that applies to other securities dis-
closures, including SEC oversight through its review of issuer securities filings 
and, when applicable, liability exposure for fraudulent misrepresentations. 
To ensure the board’s involvement in overseeing both the development of 
issuers’ sustainability practices and the disclosure of those practices, this proposal 
would require directors to certify the accuracy of the disclosures contained in the 
SD&A. This would establish a framework for effective director oversight and 
bring accountability to the disclosure regime. The SD&A would thereby address 
the key investor concern that boards consider sustainability practices with a mate-
rial impact on, or posing material risks to, the firm’s operations and incorporate 
those considerations into their strategic planning.30 
See, e.g., Dan Konigsburg et al., Why Sustainability Is a Board-Level Risk, WALL ST. J. (July 6, 
2018, 12:01 AM), https://deloitte.wsj.com/cfo/2018/07/06/why-sustainability-is-a-board-level-risk/ 
[https://perma.cc/8ZCM-DSKD] (explaining how sustainability disclosure provides investors with 
insight as to how the issuer is incorporating sustainability its risk policies and strategy). 
Incorporating sustainability disclosure into annual financial reporting would 
reflect the increasing economic importance of sustainability considerations and 
the growing concern they pose for investors and capital markets. It would be an 
important first step toward improving the uniformity, reliability, and comparabil-
ity of sustainability disclosure and would provide important data to allow the cap-
ital markets to evaluate the impact of sustainable business practices. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets the groundwork by describing 
existing sustainability disclosure practices. Part II identifies the limitations of 
existing practices and advocates for integrating mandatory sustainability disclo-
sure into financial reporting. Part III proposes a new approach to sustainability 
disclosure: the SD&A. Part IV identifies advantages and potential limitations of 
the proposal. 
I. BACKGROUND AND EXISTING SUSTAINABILITY DISCLOSURE PRACTICES 
This Part provides a brief background of corporate sustainability disclosure. It 
begins with an overview of the scope and rationale for sustainability disclosure. It 
then outlines the history of the SEC’s regulation of sustainability disclosure as 
well as sources of mandatory sustainability reporting requirements beyond the 
federal securities laws. Finally, it identifies existing approaches to voluntary dis-
closure and the institutional players that contribute to the voluntary regime. 
A. THE CONCEPT OF SUSTAINABILITY DISCLOSURE 
Currently, there is no consensus on a precise definition of “sustainability.” Use 
of the term is often traced to a 1987 United Nations (UN) report defining sustain-
ability as “[actions that] . . . meet the needs and aspirations of the present without  
30. 
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compromising the ability to meet those of the future.”31 
Rep. of the World Comm’n on Env’t & Dev., Our Common Future, U.N. Doc. A/42/427, at 51 
(1987), http://www.un-documents.net/a42-427.htm [https://perma.cc/NB8C-Y2MF]; see, e.g., Sarah 
Widder, Institutionalizing Sustainability: Implementation of Executive Order 13,514 and its Impact on 
the Environmental, Economic, and Social Performance of Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, 27 
NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 229, 229–30 (2013) (extolling “[t]he simplicity and breadth of 
this definition”). 
The UN formalized the 
principles in this report in its UN Global Compact, the “most prominent . . . [o]f 
the hundreds of international institutional and policy initiatives around corporate 
social and environmental responsibility and sustainability.”32 The idea behind 
corporate sustainability is decisionmaking that incorporates social, political, and 
ethical concerns in addition to traditional financial performance.33 As J. Robert 
Brown explained in his comment letter to the SEC: “Sustainability involves mat-
ters that can impact the long-term success of the company and the economy.”34 
J. Robert Brown, Jr., Professor of Law, Univ. Denver Sturm Coll. Law, Comment Letter on 
Concept Release on Disclosure Required by Regulation S–K (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/ 
comments/s7-06-16/s70616-374.pdf. Brown goes on to explain that “[t]hese matters relate to corporate 
governance, international tax strategies, climate change, political spending, derivatives exposures, 
investments in human capital, and other areas of demonstrated interest for investors and the public.” Id. 
The scope of topics within sustainability continues to evolve. See, e.g., Scott J. Shackelford & Scott 
Russell, Operationalizing Cybersecurity Due Diligence: A Transatlantic Case Study, 67 S.C. L. REV. 
609, 626 (2016) (advocating “a wide view of risk management to encompass all of the dimensions of 
sustainability—economic, environmental, social, and, potentially, [cyber]security”). 
Martin Lipton notes that sustainability “encompasses a wide range of issues, such 
as climate change and other environmental risks, systemic financial stability, 
labor standards, and consumer and product safety.”35 Experts also use a variety of 
terms to describe corporate sustainability and sustainability reporting. Among 
these are “CSR” (Corporate Social Responsibility),36 “ESG” (Environmental, 
Social, and Governance),37 “triple bottom line,”38 
See, e.g., JOHN ELKINGTON, CANNIBALS WITH FORKS: THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE OF 21ST 
CENTURY BUSINESS (photo reprint 1999) (1997); see also About, DBL PARTNERS, http://www. 
dblpartners.vc/about/ [https://perma.cc/XM6Y-6SQA] (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (describing a double 
bottom line investment strategy of seeking “top-tier venture capital returns (First Bottom Line), while 
working with our companies to enable social, environmental and economic improvement in the regions 
in which they operate (Second Bottom Line)”). 
and “societal impact.”39 Some  
31. 
32. Thomas Clarke, The Widening Scope of Directors’ Duties: The Increasing Impact of Corporate 
Social and Environmental Responsibility, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 531, 551 (2016). 
33. See Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S–K, Securities Act Release No. 
10,064, Exchange Act Release No. 77,599, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,916, 23,970–71 (proposed Apr. 22, 2016) 
(surveying sustainability considerations). 
34. 
35. Lipton, supra note 5. 
36. See, e.g., John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish: Theory 
Versus Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. 1, 1 (2005). 
37. See, e.g., NASDAQ, supra note 16, at 10. The Nasdaq explains that the term sustainability is more 
commonly used by issuers, while investors commonly use the term ESG. See id. (“[W]hile this 
document primarily uses the term ‘ESG’ because it is commonly used among investors, the term 
‘sustainability’ is used interchangeably as it is more common among companies.”). 
38. 
39. See, e.g., Shlomit Azgad-Tromer, Corporations and the 99%: Team Production Revisited, 21 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 163, 184 (2016). 
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also describe sustainability disclosure as “non-financial” reporting.40 
Stu Dalheim, Vice President, Calvert Inv. Mgmt., Inc., Comment Letter on Concept Release on 
Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S–K 6 (July 21, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/ 
comments/s7-06-16/s70616-245.pdf (“Investors increasingly consider non-financial factors when 
assessing companies’ long-term performance.”). The relevance of sustainability information to 
economic performance has caused some to argue that this term is misleading. See, e.g., NASDAQ, supra 
note 16, at 10 (“The very term non-financial is a controversial point of reference, because many believe 
that ESG information is no less relevant or useful to an investor in assessing the financial prospects and 
operational performance of a company than information channeled through traditional accounting 
practices.”). 
Demand for corporate sustainability disclosure has traditionally come from 
special-interest investors, such as religious organizations and ethical investment 
funds, and non-investor special interests.41 
See, e.g., Michael S. Piwowar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Dissenting Statement at Open 
Meeting on Resource Extraction (Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/piwowar-dissenting- 
statement-at-open-meeting-resource-extraction.html [https://perma.cc/4ZKX-JVCB] (describing the 
congressional mandate to disclose resource-extraction payments as responding to the demands of non- 
shareholder special interest groups). 
More recently, however, interest in 
sustainability disclosure has spread to mainstream investors. Goldman Sachs, 
describing this trend as the “ESG Revolution,” compiled data showing a rise in 
the ESG focus of traditional investor-directed communications, such as “earnings 
transcripts, social media and asset manager initiatives.”42 
DEREK R. BINGHAM ET AL., Goldman Sachs, A REVOLUTION RISING - FROM LOW CHATTER TO 
LOUD ROAR [REDACTED] 1 (2018), https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/pages/new-energy-
landscape-folder/esg-revolution-rising/report.pdf
 
. 
Support for ESG disclo-
sure has extended to a growing percentage of the investor community.43 For 
example, at the 2017 annual meeting, Exxon shareholders voted on a shareholder 
proposal requesting the company to report “the impact on its business of compli-
ance with global climate change guidelines.”44 
Exxon Shareholders Approve Measure on Climate-Change Report, CNBC (May 31, 2017, 4:37 
PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/31/exxon-steps-up-efforts-to-sway-shareholders-on-climate-report- 
vote.html [https://perma.cc/9SUH-BP8K]. 
The proposal received more than 
sixty-two percent of the votes cast, a tally that included the support of BlackRock 
and Vanguard.45 A similar proposal at Occidental Petroleum passed earlier in 
2017.46 
See Rob Kozlowski, Occidental Petroleum Shareholders Pass Climate Change Disclosure 
Proposal, PENSIONS & INVS. (May 12, 2017, 5:01 PM), http://www.pionline.com/article/20170512/ 
ONLINE/170519941/occidental-petroleum-shareholders-pass-climate-change-disclosure-proposal 
[https://perma.cc/98HQ-UGAN]. 
Traditional investors’ growing interest in sustainability disclosure is based on a 
variety of rationales. Many see sustainability information as facilitating their abil-
ity to evaluate a firm’s operational plan from a longer term perspective.47  
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. See generally id. (describing the growing investor support for ESG disclosure). 
44. 
45. Id. 
46. 
47. 
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See, e.g., Sanford Lewis, No-Action Letter on The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Exchange Act Rule 
14a-8 (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2017/johnharringtongold 
man012317-14a8.pdf (explaining that investors use sustainability disclosures to evaluate “long-term value 
creation and systemic risk”). 
Investors also use sustainability disclosures to evaluate business risk48 
See, e.g., Jonas Kron, Senior Vice President, Trillium Asset Mgmt., No-Action Letter on The 
Middleby Corporation Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/ 
corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2018/trilliumassetetal032318-14a8.pdf (arguing in support of shareholder 
proposal requesting company to provide a sustainability report that ESG reporting “allows companies to 
better integrate and capture value from existing sustainability efforts, identify gaps and opportunities in 
policies and practices, strengthen risk management programs, stimulate innovation, enhance company- 
wide communications, and recruit and retain employees”). 
and have 
suggested that sustainability disclosure provides insights into a board’s level of 
engagement and oversight, enabling them to determine the extent to which the 
board is aware of and managing factors that affect the viability of the company’s 
strategy over the intermediate and long term.49 
See, e.g., Ronald P. O’Hanley, Long-Term Value Begins at the Board, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOV. & FIN. REG. (Mar. 20, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/20/long-term-value- 
begins-at-the-board/ [https://perma.cc/4Y39-P6VT] (describing perspective of State Street Global 
Advisors). 
These analyses identify a potential relationship between sustainability and eco-
nomic performance. Although the evidence regarding this is mixed, several stud-
ies support the claim that sustainability factors are related to operating 
performance and share price. A recent Bank of America Merrill Lynch study 
found that positive ESG factors are associated with higher earnings quality and 
lower risk of bankruptcy.50 
See SAVITA SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., BANK OF AM. MERRILL LYNCH, EQUITY STRATEGY FOCUS 
POINT—ESG PART II: A DEEPER DIVE 2 (2017), http://www.hubsustentabilidad.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2017/07/equityStrategyFocusPointADeeperDive.pdf. 
The report claims that ESG attributes are “a better sig-
nal of future earnings volatility than any other measure we have found.”51 
Similarly, an academic paper surveying the empirical ESG literature reports that 
the vast majority of empirical studies document correlations between sustainabil-
ity practices and economic performance.52 
GORDON L. CLARK, ANDREAS FEINER & MICHAEL VIEHS, UNIV. OF OXFORD & ARABESQUE 
PARTNERS, FROM THE STOCKHOLDER TO THE STAKEHOLDER: HOW SUSTAINABILITY CAN DRIVE 
FINANCIAL OUTPERFORMANCE 9 (rev. ed. 2015), https://arabesque.com/research/From_the_stockholder_ 
to_the_stakeholder_web.pdf. 
Notably, these studies are in tension 
with the Department of Labor’s recent suggestion that ESG factors are typically 
collateral to economic considerations.53 
To the extent there is a relationship between sustainability and performance, 
sustainability disclosure would seem to fit within the traditional objectives of the 
federal securities laws. However, the history of sustainability disclosure within 
the mandatory disclosure regime in the United States has been fragmented. For 
the most part, as detailed further in the pages that follow, the SEC has taken the 
view that sustainability disclosure is ordinarily not material, and that mandatory  
48. 
49. 
50. 
51. Id. at 1. 
52. 
53. See Canary, supra note 8 (referring to “otherwise collateral ESG issues” but acknowledging that 
such issues may sometimes “involve business risks or opportunities that are properly treated as 
economic considerations themselves”). 
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disclosure should be limited to information that is useful to investors.54 The 
SEC’s approach has had the result of creating a norm that sustainability disclo-
sure is not a component of financial reporting—a norm that this Article seeks to 
change. 
B. THE HISTORY OF SUSTAINABILITY DISCLOSURE UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES 
LAWS 
Efforts by various social and political groups to use the securities laws to 
obtain greater corporate sustainability disclosure began in the 1960s, partly in 
response to concerns about the rise of corporate power and its related societal 
implications.55 In 1971, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and the 
Project on Corporate Responsibility filed a rulemaking petition asking the SEC to 
require public companies to make civil rights and environmental disclosures.56 
The SEC refused to adopt the requested rule changes, reasoning that expanded 
social disclosures were not required under the existing materiality standard.57 
After protracted litigation challenging this decision, the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint, holding that the SEC’s decision not to 
require specific disclosures and to require disclosure only of information that was 
reasonably likely to be material to investors was entitled to substantial 
deference.58 
The SEC’s position—that its disclosure requirements should be limited to in-
formation that is economically material to investors—was articulated in a 1977 
54. Cf. Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social 
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1247–63 (1999) (challenging the SEC’s position that 
sustainability disclosure is usually not economically material). 
55. See, e.g., id. at 1246 (“Efforts to use the federal securities laws to promote expanded social 
disclosure began during the late 1960s, growing out of the anti-war and environmental movements.”); 
see also Rob Gray, The Social Accounting Project and Accounting Organizations and Society: 
Privileging Engagement, Imaginings, New Accountings and Pragmatism over Critique?, 27 ACCT., 
ORGS. & SOC’Y 687, 690 (2002) (explaining that, in the mid-to-late 1960s, interest in social accounting 
grew “contemporaneously, with an apparent growth in anxiety about corporate ethics, corporate power, 
social responsibility and ecological degradation”). 
56. For a description of this petition, see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC (NRDC I), 
389 F. Supp. 689, 694 (D.D.C. 1974). 
57. See Williams, supra note 54, at 1248–49. The SEC did issue an interpretive release, calling 
attention to issuers’ obligations to disclose “matters pertaining to [the] environment” and “[c]ertain 
[c]ivil [r]ights matters,” where material, such as when the existing requirements regarding disclosure of 
legal proceedings applied. Disclosures Pertaining to Matters Involving the Environment and Civil 
Rights, Securities Act Release No. 5170, Exchange Act Release No. 9252, 36 Fed. Reg. 13,989, 13,989 
(July 29, 1971). Subsequently, the SEC adopted part of the proposal relating to environmental 
procedures when, in 1973, it codified the requirement that material legal proceedings relating to 
environmental matters be disclosed. Disclosure with Respect to Compliance with Environmental 
Requirements and Other Matters, Securities Act Release No. 5386, Exchange Act Release No. 10,166, 
38 Fed. Reg. 12,100, 12,100–03 (May 9, 1973). This requirement was subsequently incorporated into 
Regulation S–K. Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 6383, Exchange 
Act Release No. 18,524, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380, 11,380, 11,388 (Mar. 16, 1982). 
58. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1049, 1056–57 (D.D.C. 1979) 
(“[E]nvironmental concerns to some extent run counter to the SEC’s primary mandate of financial 
protection of investors . . . .”). 
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report of the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure, led by then-former 
SEC Commissioner A. A. Sommer, Jr. (the Sommer Report).59 The Sommer 
Report introduced the disclosure framework that has subsequently been imple-
mented through Regulation S–K.60 As Commissioner Sommer later explained, 
the Committee concluded that the SEC “should not try to use its powers to com-
pel disclosure concerning, for instance, social or environmental matters, hiring 
practices, and the like, unless it could be shown that such matters were material 
to investors.”61 
The SEC has adhered to the approach reflected in the Sommer Report. With 
limited exceptions, described below, the SEC has not required issuers to disclose 
specific categories of sustainability information. Instead, the SEC has taken the 
position that such information needs to be disclosed only to the extent it relates to 
an existing disclosure requirement or is necessary to prevent a required disclosure 
from being misleading.62 The benchmark is whether the information is material 
to investors.63 The SEC’s usual position is that, in the context of disclosure 
requirements, the materiality standard64 should be understood in terms of the 
information’s economic or financial impact.65 As the then-Director of the SEC’s 
Division of Corporate Finance explained, “In assessing materiality, the SEC staff 
takes the view that the reasonable investor generally focuses on matters that have 
affected, or will affect, a company’s profitability and financial outlook.”66 
In articulating this standard, the SEC has relied on the definition of materiality 
first announced in the context of proxy fraud in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, 
59. ADVISORY COMM. ON CORP. DISCLOSURE, 95TH CONG., REP. TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION 391–99 (Comm. Print 1977). 
60. Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S–K, Securities Act Release No. 
10,064, Exchange Act Release No. 77,599, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,916, 23,918 (proposed Apr. 22, 2016). The 
Sommer Report has served as an ongoing guide to the SEC in evaluating the appropriate scope and 
structure of the mandatory disclosure regime. See id. at 23,918–21 (providing a historical overview of 
Regulation S–K). 
61. A.A. Sommer, Jr., The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Disclosure Study, 1 J. COMP. 
CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 145, 149 (1978). 
62. See, e.g., Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S–K, Securities Act Release 
No. 10,064, Exchange Act Release No. 77,599, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,916, 23,970 (proposed Apr. 22, 2016) 
(“The Commission, however, has determined in the past that disclosure relating to environmental and 
other matters of social concern should not be required of all registrants unless appropriate to further a 
specific congressional mandate or unless, under the particular facts and circumstances, such matters are 
material.”). 
63. See id. 
64. A related issue, to be explored further, infra notes 245–46 and accompanying text, is the 
relationship between disclosure-related materiality and the scope of issuer liability for securities fraud. 
See, e.g., Stratte–McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 100–04 (2d Cir. 2015). 
65. For example, according to the SEC, a minority of the Advisory Committee that prepared the 
Sommer Report believed “that disclosure of social and environmental information is material to an 
investment decision regardless of its economic impact on the financial performance of the company,” in 
part because that information might reflect on the quality of management. Business and Financial 
Disclosure Required by Regulation S–K, Securities Act Release No. 10,064, Exchange Act Release No. 
77,599, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,916, 23,971 n.687 (proposed Apr. 22, 2016). 
66. Memorandum from David B.H. Martin, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to Laura 
Unger, Acting Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 2001 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 579 (May 8, 2001), at *15. 
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Inc.67 In TSC, the Supreme Court defined information as material “if there is a 
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important 
in deciding how to vote,” meaning that there is “a substantial likelihood that the 
disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor 
as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”68 
The scope of this definition is itself unclear because even in the context of invest-
ment decisions, investors might reasonably be interested in information that is 
nonfinancial or only tangentially related to the issuer’s financial performance.69 
Recognizing that the question of what information is material to investors is an 
evolving one, on several occasions the SEC modified its approach to require 
more comprehensive disclosure with respect to specific sustainability issues. One 
example is the SEC’s shift toward broadening the required disclosure about exec-
utive compensation. After years of taking a restrictive approach in which the SEC 
regularly went so far as to allow corporations to exclude shareholder proposals 
seeking to address executive pay,70 the SEC changed its position and imposed 
extensive mandatory disclosure requirements.71 The SEC subsequently modified 
and expanded these disclosure requirements.72 Notably, even accepting the view 
that the size and structure of executive compensation is economically material to 
investors,73 some elements of the required disclosure are arguably a stretch, such 
as the rule that issuers must disclose all executive perquisites valued at $10,000 
or more.74 Nonetheless, the importance of this disclosure is reflected in the SEC’s 
recent enforcement action against Dow Chemical for failing to disclose executive 
perks adequately.75 
67. 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
68. Id. The Court subsequently concluded that the TSC definition of materiality was applicable in 
transactional contexts as well. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988) (“We now expressly 
adopt the TSC Industries standard of materiality for the § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 context.”). 
69. By way of example, some investors screen their investments according to social or ethical 
criteria. Michael S. Knoll, Ethical Screening in Modern Financial Markets: The Conflicting Claims 
Underlying Socially Responsible Investment, 57 BUS. LAW. 681, 684–89 (2002) (explaining that some 
investors screen their investments according to social or ethical criteria). 
70. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 VAND. L. 
REV. 1129, 1158–59, 1159 n.132 (1993) (describing the SEC policy of permitting the exclusion of such 
proposals as relating to ordinary business operations). 
71. See Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6962, Exchange Act 
Release No. 31,327, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,126, 48,126–59 (Oct. 21, 1992) (imposing extensive disclosure 
requirements for executive compensation). 
72. See, e.g., Kenneth Rosen, “Who Killed Katie Couric?” and Other Tales from the World of 
Executive Compensation Reform, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2907, 2912 (2008) (describing the SEC’s 
“significant changes to the existing system of disclosure related to executive and director compensation” 
in 2006). 
73. See generally LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED 
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (arguing for the importance to investors of the size and 
structure of executive compensation packages). But see Bevis Longstreth, A Real World Critique of Pay 
without Performance, 30 J. CORP. L. 767, 770–71 (2005) (questioning the materiality of executive 
compensation to investors). 
74. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(c)(2)(ix)(A) (2018). 
75. See In re Dow Chem. Co., Exchange Act Release No. 83,581 (July 2, 2018) (imposing a cease- 
and-desist order and $1,750,000 penalty against Dow Chemical). 
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The SEC’s position has similarly shifted with respect to climate change disclo-
sure. In 2007, twenty-two institutional investors petitioned the SEC asking it to 
issue guidance on climate change disclosure.76 
Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. et al., Petition Before the U.S. SEC for Interpretive Guidance on 
Climate Risk Disclosure, at 2 (Sept. 18, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2007/petn4-547.pdf. 
The petition asserted that “the 
risks and opportunities many corporations face in connection with climate change 
fall squarely within the category of material information that is required to be an-
alyzed and disclosed in many corporate filings.”77 Petitioners argued that, as a 
result, climate change fell within the existing disclosure requirements of 
Regulation S–K, but that existing disclosures were both inadequate and inconsis-
tent.78 In 2010, almost three years later, the SEC issued the requested guidance in 
an interpretive release.79 The SEC advised issuers that they were required to dis-
close material information about their exposure to risks resulting from climate 
change, explaining that this requirement was based in several existing provisions 
of Regulation S–K, including the MD&A, the required disclosure of legal pro-
ceedings, and the section on risk factors.80 Issuer disclosure of climate change- 
related information increased following the interpretive release, although criticism 
of the disclosure’s quality continues,81 
A Ceres 2018 report stated that fifty-one percent of companies disclosed climate change 
information in their annual financial filings in 2017, as opposed to only forty-two percent in 2014. 
KRISTEN LANG ET AL., CERES, TURNING POINT: CORPORATE PROGRESS ON THE CERES ROADMAP FOR 
SUSTAINABILITY 11 (2018), https://www.ceres.org/node/2275 [https://perma.cc/L95Q-WWGM]. The 
report cautioned, however, that most of this reporting consisted of “boilerplate language [that failed] to 
provide investors decision-useful information.” Id.; see also Nina Hart, Note, Moving at a Glacial Pace: 
What Can State Attorneys General Do About SEC Inattention to Nondisclosure of Financially Material 
Risks Arising from Climate Change?, 40 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 99, 114 (2015) (“[C]ompanies are treating 
climate change risks with brevity and superficiality.”). 
and the SEC’s enforcement has been 
limited.82 
See Robert Repetto, It’s Time the SEC Enforced its Climate Disclosure Rules, INT’L INST. FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Mar. 23, 2016), https://www.iisd.org/blog/it-s-time-sec-enforced-its-climate- 
disclosure-rules [https://perma.cc/EG68-2BKD]. 
Climate change disclosure remains limited due in large part to the vagueness 
of the disclosure obligation and issuers’ ability to determine, in their judgment, 
that a given issue is not material enough to warrant disclosure. Exxon’s 2017 10– 
K provides an example of these limitations.83 Item 3—“Legal Proceedings”— 
briefly describes three enforcement actions by the federal Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), North Dakota, and the U.S. Treasury Department.84 
76. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 13, 45. 
79. See Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Securities Act 
Release No. 9106, Exchange Act Release No. 61,469, 75 Fed. Reg. 6289, 6290 (Feb. 8, 2010) (“The 
[SEC] is publishing this interpretive release to provide guidance to public companies regarding the 
Commission’s existing disclosure requirements as they apply to climate change matters.”). 
80. Id. at 6293–97. Because the standard focused on materiality, the guidance left the materiality 
determination, and thus the decision whether to disclose, largely in the hands of the issuer’s 
management. 
81. 
82. 
83. See ExxonMobil Corp., Annual Report (Form 10–K) (Feb. 28, 2018) (disclosing climate change- 
related risks of Exxon’s business operations). 
84. Id. at 26. 
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Later, in the notes to the financial statements, Exxon states that “a variety of 
claims have been made against ExxonMobil and certain of its consolidated sub-
sidiaries in a number of pending lawsuits.”85 The 10–K does not provide details 
about the lawsuits, yet it concludes that “[b]ased on a consideration of all relevant 
facts and circumstances, the Corporation does not believe the ultimate outcome 
of any currently pending lawsuit against ExxonMobil will have a material 
adverse effect upon the Corporation’s operations, financial condition, or financial 
statements taken as a whole.”86 Notably absent from the 10–K is any discussion 
of the high-profile litigation against Exxon by several states that allege its fossil 
fuel use poses “grave risks” to the planet.87 
Bob Van Voris, Exxon Sues the Suers in Fierce Climate-Change Case, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK 
(Feb. 13, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-13/exxon-sues-the-suers- 
in-fierce-bid-to-defeat-climate-lawsuits; see also Ephrat Livni, Big Oil Says Government Climate Change 
Lawsuits Are a “Conspiracy,” QUARTZ (Jan. 12, 2018), https://qz.com/1177685/exxonmobile-says- 
government-climate-change-lawsuits-are-a-conspiracy-against-the-company/ [https://perma.cc/666J- 
8AMQ] (describing the allegations and Exxon’s response calling the lawsuits a “conspiracy”). 
The SEC recently closed a related 
investigation of the manner in which Exxon disclosed the potential impact of cli-
mate change on the value of its assets without imposing a penalty.88 
See Dave Michaels & Bradley Olson, SEC Drops Probe of Exxon’s Climate-Change Disclosures, 
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2018, 4:32 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-drops-probe-of-exxons-climate- 
change-disclosures-1533317730?mod=djemalertNEWS [https://perma.cc/J8AZ-DZEH]. 
The SEC has also adopted rules mandating disclosure with respect to specific 
sustainability issues. In response to a worldwide focus on board diversity,89 the 
SEC issued a rule in 2009 requiring issuers to disclose “whether, and if so how, 
the nominating committee (or board) considers diversity in identifying nominees” 
for the board of directors.90 Former SEC Commissioner Mary Jo White observed 
that this rule has had limited effect, with companies’ “generally vague” board di-
versity disclosures “chang[ing] little” since its adoption.91 
Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keynote Address at the International 
Corporate Governance Network Annual Conference: Focusing the Lens of Disclosure to Set the Path 
Forward on Board Diversity, Non-GAAP, and Sustainability (June 27, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/ 
news/speech/chair-white-icgn-speech.html [https://perma.cc/C5C8-M59H]. 
The Dodd–Frank Act required the SEC to adopt disclosure requirements with 
respect to two sustainability issues: conflict minerals and resource extraction.92 
85. Id. at 86. 
86. Id. 
87. 
88. 
89. This resulted in many countries adopting gender quota requirements for corporate boards. See, 
e.g., AARON A. DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY: CORPORATE LAW, GOVERNANCE, AND 
DIVERSITY 3 (2015) (discussing gender quota laws in Norway, Sweden, and Finland). See generally 
Darren Rosenblum & Daria Roithmayr, More Than a Woman: Insights into Corporate Governance 
After the French Sex Quota, 48 IND. L. REV. 889 (2015) (analyzing the impact of France’s board 
diversity quota statute). 
90. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, Securities Act Release No. 9089, Exchange Act Release No. 
61,175, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,092, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,364 (Dec. 23, 2009). The 
Rule goes on to provide that, “[i]f the nominating committee . . . has a policy with regard to the 
consideration of diversity in identifying director nominees, [disclosure of] how this policy is 
implemented” is required. Id. at 68,343–44. 
91. 
92. See generally Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111- 
203, § 1502(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 2213–18 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 
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The SEC adopted rules in accordance with this mandate,93 although a subsequent 
Congress effectively eliminated both rules.94 
In February 2017, the Congressional Review Act (CRA) eliminated the resource extraction rule. See, 
e.g., Nick Grabar et al., Congress Rolls Back SEC Resource Extraction Payments Rule, CLEARY GOTTLIEB 
M&A & CORP. GOVERNANCE WATCH (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.clearymawatch.com/2017/02/congress- 
rolls-back-sec-resource-extraction-payments-rule/ [https://perma.cc/473G-9PV3] (reporting on this action 
and explaining that such rules gaining congressional disapproval under the CRA are “treated as though [they] 
had never taken effect”). Later in 2017, Congress suspended funding to enforce the conflict minerals rule. 
See, e.g., Marc Butler, Conflict Minerals Compliance & Reporting Requirements Continue to Face 
Uncertain Future, INTELLIGIZE (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.intelligize.com/conflict-mineral-reporting- 
requirements-continue-face-uncertain-future/ [https://perma.cc/9MJC-YCCK] (reporting this congressional 
action and SEC Chair Clayton’s statement supporting a reduction in the disclosure requirements). 
Importantly, at the time of Dodd– 
Frank’s enactment, the SEC objected to the mandates, claiming that the required 
disclosures fell outside its core mission and were apparently “geared more toward 
influencing social policy than informing investors.”95 
Aruna Viswanatha, SEC Chair Chastises Congress Over New Disclosure Rules, REUTERS (Oct. 3, 
2013, 7:25 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sec-disclosures/sec-chair-chastises-congress-over- 
new-disclosure-rules-idUSBRE99215Q20131003 [https://perma.cc/4X5E-96T8]. 
Indeed, with the limited 
exceptions described above, the SEC has adhered to the position reflected in the 
Sommer Report that, as a general matter, sustainability disclosure is not economi-
cally material and therefore need not be integrated into financial reporting. 
Commentators have called upon the SEC to do more to formalize sustainability 
disclosure.96 As part of its Disclosure Effectiveness Initiative,97 
The JOBS Act required the SEC to conduct “a review of Regulation S-K to determine how such 
requirements can be updated to modernize and simplify the registration process.” U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, supra note 12, at 1 (citing Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. 112-106, 126 
Stat. 306 (2012)). In response, the SEC staff issued a report in December 2013 recommending “a 
comprehensive review” of disclosure requirements for all public companies, id. at 104, which the SEC 
created a Disclosure Effectiveness Initiative to carry out. Robert Herz, Disclosure Effectiveness Gains 
Traction and Momentum, COMPLIANCE WEEK (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.complianceweek.com/blogs/ 
robert-herz/disclosure-effectiveness-gains-traction-and-momentum [https://perma.cc/QE69-VXM5]. 
the SEC issued a 
Concept Release in April 2016.98 The 341-page release listed various potential 
reforms to the disclosure system and invited comment on the extent to which 
SEC rules should mandate sustainability disclosure.99 Specifically, the release 
requested comment on the importance of sustainability disclosure for shareholder  
U.S.C.) (covering “Disclosure Relating to Conflict Minerals Originating in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo”); id. § 1504, 2200–22 (covering “Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers”). 
93. Conflict Minerals, Exchange Act Release No. 67,716, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,273 (Sept. 12, 2012); 
Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 67,717, 77 Fed. Reg. 
56,365 (Sept. 12, 2012). But see David M. Lynn, The Dodd–Frank Act’s Specialized Corporate 
Disclosure: Using the Securities Laws to Address Public Policy Issues, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 327, 331, 
339 (2011) (criticizing the SEC’s implementation of this mandate). 
94. 
95. 
96. See Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 14, at 1–2 (explaining how response to SEC’s 2016 
Concept Release reflected “an enormous pent up demand by disclosure recipients for more and better 
disclosure” (quoting GELLASCH, supra note 13, at 10)). 
97. 
98. Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S–K, Securities Act Release No. 
10,064, Exchange Act Release No. 77,599, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,916 (proposed Apr. 22, 2016). 
99. Id. at 23,970. 
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investment and voting decisions.100 In response, the SEC received tens of thou-
sands of comments on sustainability disclosure,101 with a substantial number of 
investors requesting that the SEC “require annual, uniform sustainability report-
ing from public companies as part of the overhaul of the agency’s disclosure re-
gime.”102 To date, however, the SEC has not acted on that request. 
Investors have attempted to remedy these shortcomings by seeking disclosures 
on a company-specific basis. One mechanism for doing so is the SEC’s share-
holder proposal rule, Rule 14a-8.103 For many years, shareholders have used Rule 
14a-8 with mixed success to introduce proposals addressed to social policy con-
cerns.104 
See, e.g., Scott Hirst, Social Responsibility Resolutions (Harv. Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 
2016-06, 2016), https://pcg.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Scott-Hirst-Social-Responsibility- 
Resolutions.pdf (describing this practice). 
Such attempts have raised controversy among critics who contend that 
these proposals are often brought by special interest groups with limited eco-
nomic stakes and in fact advance views tangential or even contrary to most share-
holders’ economic interests.105 
Two developments have given shareholder proposals a more meaningful role 
in sustainability disclosure. First, proponents have modified their proposals to 
concentrate on seeking sustainability disclosure and oversight rather than 
attempting to cause the company to adopt specific sustainability policies.106 
Second, the proposals are receiving growing support from shareholders in general 
and from large, mainstream institutional investors in particular.107 
100. See id. (“[W]e seek feedback on which, if any, sustainability and public policy disclosures are 
important to an understanding of a registrant’s business and financial condition and whether there are 
other considerations that make these disclosures important to investment and voting decisions.”). 
101. See, e.g., GELLASCH, supra note 13, at 10 (“As of August 16, 2016, the SEC had received 26,512 
comments in response to its Concept Release.”). 
102. Odom, supra note 23. 
103. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2018). The shareholder proposal rule enables shareholders who meet 
various ownership and procedural requirements to introduce a proposal on which shareholders can vote 
at the issuer’s annual meeting and to have that proposal included in the issuer’s proxy statement. Id. The 
rule provides several bases upon which the issuer can seek to exclude the proposal. Id. For more on this 
rule, see Fisch, supra note 70, at 1146–47. 
104. 
105. Classic examples include the shareholder proposal in Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 618 
F. Supp. 554 (D.D.C. 1985), asking Iroquois to stop force-feeding the geese used to make pate de foie 
gras and the proposal in Philip Morris Cos., 1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 335 (Feb. 13, 1990), seeking to 
stop Philip Morris from conducting business in tobacco or tobacco products. 
106. See, e.g., Devon Energy Corp., 2014 SEC No-Act LEXIS 271 (Mar. 19, 2014) (rejecting 
issuer’s attempt to exclude shareholder proposal requesting “that the company prepare a report on the 
company’s goals and plans to address global concerns regarding the contribution of fossil fuel use to 
climate change, including analysis of long- and short-term financial and operational risks to the 
company” and finding that the proposal “does not seek to micromanage the company to such a degree 
that exclusion of the proposal would be appropriate”). 
107. 
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See, e.g., Thomas Singer, Environmental and Social Proposals in the 2017 Proxy Season, HARV. 
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 26, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/10/ 
26/environmental-and-social-proposals-in-the-2017-proxy-season/ [https://perma.cc/WB8E-5CUK] 
(“Large institutional investors, such as BlackRock and Vanguard, are beginning to exert pressure on 
companies by supporting E&S proposals that call for greater disclosure of issues they deem material 
to shareholder value.”). 
A recent Conference Board report observed that almost half of the share-
holder proposals brought to a vote during the 2017 proxy season concerned 
ESG issues and that, although most received limited support, the number of 
proposals supported by a majority of votes cast continues to increase.108 For 
example, during the 2017 proxy season, a majority of shareholders at three 
leading companies—Occidental Petroleum, PPL, and Exxon Mobil— 
approved shareholder proposals requesting greater disclosure on the potential 
effects of climate change.109 
See Cydney Posner, Are Shareholder Proposals on Climate Change Becoming a Thing?, 
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 21, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard. 
edu/2017/06/21/are-shareholder-proposals-on-climate-change-becoming-a-thing/ [https://perma. 
cc/JAV2-KEV6]. 
Among the shareholders voting in favor of the 
proposals were institutional heavyweights BlackRock and Vanguard,110 
See id.; Steven Mufson, Financial Firms Lead Shareholder Rebellion Against ExxonMobil 
Climate Change Policies, WASH. POST (May 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy- 
environment/wp/2017/05/31/exxonmobil-is-trying-to-fend-off-a-shareholder-rebellion-over-climate- 
change/?utm_term=.9579fd3049f6 [https://perma.cc/XVA6-PDDL] (“BlackRock and Vanguard are the 
biggest shareholders in ExxonMobil, owning 13 percent . . . .”); cf. Jan Fichtner et al., Hidden Power of 
the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-Concentration of Corporate Ownership, and New Financial 
Risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 298 (2017) (describing BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street as the “Big Three” 
of the passive fund industry). 
both 
of which hold substantial stakes in most large public companies.111 
See, e.g., Rachel Evans et al., BlackRock and Vanguard Are Less Than a Decade Away From 
Managing $20 Trillion, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 4, 2017, 2:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
features/2017-12-04/blackrock-and-vanguard-s-20-trillion-future-is-closer-than-you-think [https:// 
perma.cc/WT9N-8Q3H] (quoting Vanguard founder Jack Bogle as stating that BlackRock, State 
Street, and Vanguard collectively own about twenty percent of the “biggest U.S. companies”). 
The New 
York City Common Retirement Fund, a cosponsor of the Exxon proposal, 
described the proposal as economically motivated, explaining that “[c]limate 
change is one of the greatest long-term risks we face in our portfolio and has 
direct impact on the core business of ExxonMobil.”112 To the extent that 
shareholders continue to support proposals for increased sustainability disclo-
sure, issuers will face pressure to provide greater disclosure even in the ab-
sence of regulation.113 
See, e.g., Ed Crooks, ExxonMobil Bows to Shareholder Pressure on Climate Reporting, FIN. 
TIMES (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/8bd1f73a-dedf-11e7-a8a4-0a1e63a52f9c 
[https://perma.cc/W9U2-RPBQ] (reporting Exxon’s announcement that, in response to investor 
demands, it would “start publishing reports on the possible impact of climate policies on its 
business”). 
C. SUSTAINABILITY DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS BEYOND THE FEDERAL SECURITIES 
LAWS 
Federal securities laws are not the only source of sustainability disclosure 
requirements, some of which can be found in other areas such as federal  
108. See id. (describing the Conference Board report findings). 
109. 
110. 
111. 
112. Mufson, supra note 110. 
113. 
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environmental law,114 employment law,115 and consumer law,116 and in the laws 
of some states.117 
For example, the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010 requires any retailer 
that does business in the state and has annual worldwide gross receipts exceeding $100 million to make 
specific disclosures on its website about the efforts it makes to “eradicate slavery and human trafficking 
from [its] direct supply chain.” KAMALA D. HARRIS, ATT’Y GEN., CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE 
CALIFORNIA TRANSPARENCY IN SUPPLY CHAINS ACT: A RESOURCE GUIDE, at i (2015), https://oag.ca. 
gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/sb657/resource-guide.pdf. The Act requires disclosures on five areas— 
verification, audits, certification, internal accountability, and training—and even companies that take no 
actions relating to a given category must disclose that fact. Id. at 4. The statute provides no private right 
of action and is enforceable exclusively by the California Attorney General. Id. 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers have also been using class actions—based on state consumer protection statutes or 
claims of false advertising—in an effort to create broader sustainability disclosure obligations. In 
Barber v. Nestlé  USA, Inc., plaintiffs sought to impose an obligation on Nestlé to disclose that its cat 
food likely contained some seafood that was “produced by forced labor.” 154 F. Supp. 3d 954, 957 (C.D. 
Cal. 2015). In Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2016), plaintiff sought to force 
Mars to disclose on its chocolate bars that they contained cocoa beans likely picked under conditions of 
child or slave labor. In Hall v. SeaWorld Entm’t, Inc., No. 3:15-CV-660-CAB-RBB, 2015 WL 9659911 
(S.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2015), plaintiffs sought to require SeaWorld to disclose facts concerning the health 
and welfare of the killer whales it held in captivity. To date, such lawsuits have been largely 
unsuccessful. See, e.g., Andrew G. Barna, Note, The Early Eight and the Future of Consumer Legal 
Activism to Fight Modern-Day Slavery in Corporate Supply Chains, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1449, 
1454 (2018) (reporting that trial courts dismissed each of the initial eight consumer activist suits in 
California, although, at the time of the article’s publication, appeals were still pending in several). In 
SeaWorld, for example, the court dismissed the case, reasoning that applying plaintiffs’ theory would 
expose companies to limitless liability. 2015 WL 9659911, at *7. 
At best, however, these disclosure requirements operate in a 
piecemeal manner and do not provide a complete picture of the sustainability 
issues with a potentially material impact on issuer operations. 
Mandatory sustainability disclosure is more common in jurisdictions outside 
the United States.118 
See, e.g., INITIATIVE FOR RESPONSIBLE INV., CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY DISCLOSURE 
EFFORTS BY NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS AND STOCK EXCHANGES (2015), http://iri.hks.harvard.edu/files/ 
iri/files/corporate_social_responsibility_disclosure_3-27-15.pdf (listing legislation adopted in twenty- 
three countries requiring public companies to disclose environmental or social information); Galit A. 
Sarfaty, Regulating Through Numbers: A Case Study of Corporate Sustainability Reporting, 53 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 575, 598 (2013) (describing European countries’ disclosure requirements). 
114. See, e.g., David W. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational Regulation: A 
Law and Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379, 381–84 (2005) (providing an overview of 
environmental law disclosure requirements). 
115. See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency, 63 STAN. L. 
REV. 351, 356 (2011) (advocating the expanded use of disclosure requirements in employment law). 
116. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech and the Consumer “Right to 
Know,” 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 421, 424 (2016) (describing the expanding universe of disclosure requirements 
based on a “consumer right to know”). 
117. 
118. 
Although a comprehensive examination of foreign jurisdictions’ requirements is beyond the scope of 
this Article, it is worth noting some of the more interesting approaches to CSR, such as that in India. In 
2013, India adopted a requirement that firms develop a board-centered CSR policy and “spend at least 
two percent of their profits on CSR activities.” Afra Afsharipour, Corporate Social Responsibility and 
the Corporate Board: Assessing the Indian Experiment, in GLOBALISATION OF CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AND ITS IMPACT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 95, 96 (Jean J. du Plessis et al. eds., 
2018). 
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Since 2006, a four-institution partnership has led a project 
collecting and reporting data on required sustainability reporting across the  
globe.119 
WIM BARTELS ET AL., KPMG INT’L ET AL., CARROTS & STICKS: GLOBAL TRENDS IN 
SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING REGULATION AND POLICY (2016), https://www.globalreporting.org/ 
resourcelibrary/Carrots%20and%20Sticks-2016.pdf (summarizing growth in sustainability reporting 
instruments). 
Its 2016 report details evidence of a trend toward mandatory disclo- 
sure.120 It also analyzes mandatory and voluntary disclosures across seventy-one 
countries.121 According to the report, many of the reporting requirements are 
found in areas such as environmental law rather than investor-oriented regulation, 
but stock exchanges and financial regulators are the source of almost one-third of 
the requirements, many of which take the form of an obligation to comply or 
explain.122 
Id. at 13–14; see also Virginia Harper Ho, “Comply or Explain” and the Future of Nonfinancial 
Reporting, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 317 (2017) (describing the “comply or explain” approach and 
advocating its adoption in the United States for sustainability reporting); Jerry K.C. Koh & Victoria 
Leong, The Rise of the Sustainability Reporting Megatrend: A Corporate Governance Perspective, 18 
BUS. L. INT’L 233, 233–34 (2017) (describing the Singapore Stock Exchange’s 2016 amendment to its 
manual requiring issuers to produce sustainability reports on a “comply or explain” basis). 
Stock exchange reporting requirements are especially prevalent in emerging markets. BARTELS ET 
AL., KPMG INT’L ET AL., supra note 119, at 15. See generally INITIATIVE FOR RESPONSIBLE INV., supra 
note 118 (reporting that six stock exchanges, including the London Stock Exchange, require social or 
environmental disclosure); KPMG, BUSINESS RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING (2017), https://assets.kpmg. 
com/content/dam/kpmg/in/pdf/2017/07/Business-Responsibility-Reporting.pdf (describing the implementation 
of the Security and Exchange Board of India’s requirement that the top one hundred Indian companies 
include sustainability in their annual financial reporting). 
The EU’s 2014 directive mandating sustainability disclosure is perhaps the 
most notable development in this regard.123 It required large companies across 
the EU to publish information on their policies with respect to environmental pro-
tection, social responsibility, human rights, anti-corruption, and board diversity, 
starting in 2018.124 
Non-Financial Reporting, EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy- 
euro/company-reporting-and-auditing/company-reporting/non-financial-reporting_en#how-to-report 
[https://perma.cc/358V-U6NE] (last visited Feb. 13, 2019). 
The directive expressly terms this information part of a com-
pany’s “non-financial statement” and does not appear to contemplate the integra-
tion of these disclosures with issuers’ financial reporting.125 
In June 2017, the EU published guidelines to assist companies in complying 
with the directive.126 Although not mandatory, the guidelines clarify that the 
directive’s focus differs importantly from U.S. federal securities disclosure, in 
that the EU directive is explicitly stakeholder, rather than shareholder, ori-
ented.127 By December 2017, all EU member states had implemented the direc-
tive through national legislation, although the form of that legislation varies 
119. 
120. Id. at 9 (observing that “[m]andatory instruments dominate”). 
121. Id. 
122. 
123. Directive 2014/95, of the European Parliament and of the Council of Oct. 22, 2014, art. 1, 2014 
O.J. (L 330/1) 1, 5 (EU). 
124. 
125. Directive 2014/95, of the European Parliament and of the Council of Oct. 22, 2014, art. 1, 2014 
O.J. (L 330/1) 1, 5 (EU). 
126. Communication from the Commission on Guidelines on Non-Financial Reporting (Methodology 
for Reporting Non-Financial Information), 2017 O.J. (C 215), 1, 4 (EU). 
127. See id. at 9 (“Companies are expected to consider the information needs of all relevant 
stakeholders.”). 
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“according to local conditions.”128 The EU directive is an important step that 
reflects an emerging global trend toward mandatory reporting, but it has also 
faced criticism from those who argue that its approach is likely to have limited ef-
ficacy in improving disclosure quality.129 
D. VOLUNTARY SUSTAINABILITY DISCLOSURE 
In the absence of a uniform and universal mandatory regime, market forces 
continue to fuel the growth of voluntary sustainability disclosure.130 Most sustain-
ability information is disclosed not in issuer financial or securities filings, but in 
standalone sustainability reports. The Governance & Accountability Institute 
reported that, in 2016, eighty-two percent of S&P 500 companies published sus-
tainability or corporate responsibility reports.131 
Governance & Accountability Inst., Flash Report: 82% of the S&P 500 Companies Published 
Corporate Sustainability Reports in 2016, 3BL MEDIA (May 31, 2017, 2:30 PM), https://3blmedia.com/ 
News/Flash-Report-82-SP-500-Companies-Published-Corporate-Sustainability-Reports-2016 [https:// 
perma.cc/YEW9-PEL9]. 
These reports vary in their length 
and the range of topics covered. It is increasingly common for sustainability 
reports to exceed one hundred pages in length, and some issuers produce multiple 
sustainability reports, each on different topics.132 
See, e.g., CTR. FOR SUSTAINABILITY & EXCELLENCE, SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING TRENDS IN 
NORTH AMERICA 16 & fig.9 (2017), https://www.cse-net.org/wp-content/uploads/documents/ 
Sustainability-Reporting-Trends-in-North%20America%20_RS.pdf (reporting that, in its sample of 
sustainability reports published by North American issuers in 2015–2016, the average report was fifty- 
seven pages long, and more than ten percent exceeded one hundred pages). 
For example, in 2017, Apple 
produced both an environmental responsibility report133 
APPLE, INC., ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT: 2017 PROGRESS REPORT, COVERING 
FISCAL YEAR 2016, at 3 (2017), https://images.apple.com/environment/pdf/Apple_Environmental_ 
Responsibility_Report_2017.pdf. 
and a supplier responsi-
bility report,134 
APPLE, INC., SUPPLIER RESPONSIBILITY: 2017 PROGRESS REPORT 2 (2017), https://images.apple. 
com/supplier-responsibility/pdf/Apple-Progress-Report-2017.pdf. 
and provided additional descriptions of its inclusion and diversity 
initiatives on its website.135 
Inclusion and Diversity, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/diversity/ [https://perma.cc/XS9J- 
QZFP] (last visited Feb. 13, 2019). 
The dominance of voluntary disclosure and the varied sources of that disclo-
sure have contributed to the growth of global standard setters seeking to promul-
gate disclosure standards or guidelines, or rate issuers on the quality of their 
disclosure or sustainability practices. The number of standard setters, data reposi-
tories, and ratings organizations is huge and continues to grow.136 Although a 
description of all the important and relevant institutions and standards is beyond 
128. Innovative Implementation of EU Directive, supra note 22. 
129. Constance Z. Wagner, Evolving Norms of Corporate Social Responsibility: Lessons Learned 
from the European Union Directive on Non-Financial Reporting Transactions, 19 TENN. J. BUS. L. 619, 
624 (2018) (“The element of government regulation embodied in the Directive may not be a sufficient 
condition to achieve the policy goal of improved CSR reporting.”). 
130. See Walter, supra note 19. 
131. 
132. 
133. 
134. 
135. 
136. See, e.g., BARTELS ET AL., KPMG INT’L ET AL., supra note 119, at 10 (reporting that 2016 
research identified 383 sustainability reporting instruments in sixty-four countries). 
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the scope of this Article,137 the following discussion highlights a few of the most 
prominent examples. 
One way that private organizations contribute to the quality and usability of 
sustainability disclosure is by promulgating disclosure standards. The Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI), an international organization founded twenty years 
ago as a U.S. non-profit, is one of the best-known private standard-setting organi-
zations. Companies around the world use the GRI’s standards for sustainability 
reporting in whole or in part.138 
GRI Standards, GRI, https://www.globalreporting.org/standards [https://perma.cc/7GXM- 
QK54] (last visited Feb. 13, 2019); see also KMPG, THE ROAD AHEAD: THE KPMG SURVEY OF 
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING 2017, at 29 (2017), https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/ 
kpmg/xx/pdf/2017/10/kpmg-survey-of-corporate-responsibility-reporting-2017.pdf. 
In 2010, the GRI and the UN Global Compact signed an accord in which the GRI agreed to integrate 
the UN Global Compact’s reporting framework into its sustainability reporting guidelines. United 
Nations Global Compact, GRI, https://www.globalreporting.org/information/about-gri/alliances-and- 
synergies/Pages/United-Nations-Global-Compact.aspx [https://perma.cc/93QW-ANTE] (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2019). 
In its 2017 worldwide survey of companies that 
report sustainability information, KMPG found that seventy-three percent used 
the GRI standards.139 The GRI also maintains a free searchable database of more 
than 46,000 individual issuer sustainability reports.140 
Sustainability Disclosure Database, GRI, http://database.globalreporting.org/ [https://perma.cc/ 
9SWV-JJ3C] (last visited Feb. 19, 2019). 
Another well-known standard-setting organization is the Sustainability 
Accounting Standards Board (SASB).141 In contrast to the GRI, the SASB’s focus 
has been to develop disclosure standards that are incorporated into SEC filings 
rather than separate sustainability reports. To this end, the SASB has developed 
industry-specific disclosure standards for seventy-seven industries.142 The 
SASB’s position is that its standards either are or should be incorporated into 
issuer financial reporting under the current legal requirements.143 
SASB, THE STATE OF DISCLOSURE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SUSTAINABILITY 
DISCLOSURE IN SEC FILINGS, at i (2017), https://www.sasb.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/2017State- 
of-Disclosure-Report-web.pdf. 
According to 
the SASB, its “standards focus on known trends and uncertainties that are reason-
ably likely to affect the financial condition or operating performance of a com-
pany and therefore would warrant disclosure under Regulation S–K.”144 
The volume of sustainability information disclosed in accordance with these 
and other standards complicates the task of evaluating a particular issuer’s sus-
tainability practices.145 
See, e.g., Rate the Raters: Understanding the Universe of Corporate Sustainability Rankings, 
SUSTAINABILITY, http://sustainability.com/rate-the-raters/ [https://perma.cc/V8SG-ZRXE] (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2019) (“There are a dizzying number and variety of external ratings, rankings, indices and 
awards that seek to measure corporate sustainability performance.”). 
A number of organizations offer sustainability rankings or  
137. For a list and brief description of key institutions, see id. app.1 at 23–24. 
138. 
139. KMPG, supra note 138, at 29. 
140. 
141. Standards Overview, supra note 18. 
142. Id. 
143. 
144. Id. 
145. 
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ratings to assist in this endeavor.146 
The Global Initiative for Sustainability Ratings (GISR), for example, databases hundreds of 
ratings and indexes. See, e.g., Barry B. Burr, Global Initiative for Sustainability Ratings Launches 
Website for Comprehensive ESG Data, PENSIONS & INVS. (Apr. 2, 2015, 2:49 PM), http://www. 
pionline.com/article/20150402/ONLINE/150409961/global-initiative-for-sustainability-ratings-launches- 
website-for-comprehensive-esg-data [https://perma.cc/6H7E-XWCU] (describing the GISR 
database). 
One of the best-known indices is the Dow 
Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI).147 
For a general description of this comprehensive index, see About Us, ROBECOSAM, https:// 
www.sustainability-indices.com/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/2BFG-YLKQ] (last visited Oct. 25, 2018). 
Notably, the DJSI is based not on public dis-
closures but on information collected directly by invitation from 3,400 world- 
wide issuers through a questionnaire called the Corporate Sustainability 
Assessment.148 
See generally Corporate Sustainability Assessment, ROBECOSAM, https://www.sustainability- 
indices.com/sustainability-assessment/corporate-sustainability-assessment.html [https://perma.cc/ 
F3DK-BHLP] (last visited Feb. 20, 2019) (describing the Corporate Sustainability Assessment). 
The data are based on “approximately 80-120 questions on finan-
cially relevant economic, environmental and social factors that are relevant to the 
companies’ success, but that are under-researched in conventional financial anal-
ysis.”149 The DJSI rates top companies annually and is billed as the “gold star for 
corporate sustainability.”150 
Top Companies Listed on Dow Jones Sustainability Index, SEC. NEWSWIRE (Sept. 18, 2017), 
https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/88327-top-companies-listed-on-dow-jones-sustainability- 
index [https://perma.cc/SX8D-2DKP]. 
Another rating organization, the CDP (formerly the Carbon Disclosure 
Project), publishes a variety of research based on voluntary environmental disclo-
sures it obtains directly from issuers.151 
About Us, CDP, https://www.cdp.net/en/info/about-us [https://perma.cc/ADC9-PPP3] (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2019). 
According to the CDP, “[r]eporting com-
panies now represent over 50% of global market capitalization.”152 
The A List 2018, CDP, https://www.cdp.net/en/scores-2017 [https://perma.cc/NEN4-76S5] (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2019). 
The CDP 
scores companies based on their transparency and environmentalism, again using 
the information they supply.153 
Another rating organization run by Newsweek publishes annual sustainability 
rankings of large issuers, the Newsweek Green Rankings.154 
Newsweek Green Rankings 2017 Methodology, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 7, 2017, 7:38 AM), http:// 
www.newsweek.com/newsweek-green-rankings-2017-methodology-739761 [https://perma.cc/X996- 
E9EX]. 
Newsweek’s method-
ology is designed to be replicable by third parties, and it discloses its precise 
underlying metrics.155 In addition, unlike the DJSI and the CDP, Newsweek’s 
rankings are based on publicly available data.156 
146. 
147. 
148. 
149. Id. 
150. 
151. 
152. 
153. Id. 
154. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
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II. LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING SUSTAINABILITY DISCLOSURE 
The structure of the existing voluntary disclosure framework is problematic for 
several reasons.157 This Part highlights some of the key problems with this regime 
to demonstrate why, despite the growth in the volume of sustainability disclosure, 
private ordering has not been successful in producing sustainability disclosures 
that meet investors’ needs. As Trillium Asset Management explained in a com-
ment letter to the SEC: “While voluntary reporting frameworks are better than 
nothing at providing ESG information at participating companies they do not pro-
vide the consistency, accuracy and completeness that is inherent in securities 
filings.”158 
Jonas Kron, Senior Vice President, Trillium Asset Mgmt. LLC, Comment Letter on Concept 
Release on Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S–K (July 21, 2016), https:// 
www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-276.pdf. 
Under the current regime, sustainability disclosures are fragmented, of incon-
sistent quality, and often unreliable.159 As explained in this Part, issuers are incen-
tivized to focus on the positive aspects of their business practices and to omit 
unfavorable information. This problem is compounded by a lack of standardiza-
tion that makes it difficult for investors to compare information across issuers, in 
addition to the limited regulatory oversight of sustainability disclosure. 
These issues stem, in part, from the voluntary nature of the current regime. 
Because disclosure is voluntary, issuers can choose which issues to address and 
which reporting metrics to apply.160 As a result, issuers overwhelmingly disclose 
only information about the areas in which their business practices are highly sus-
tainable.161 
See, e.g., VINTAGE & MERGERMARKET, A QUESTION OF QUALITY: HOW TO IMPROVE SEC 
DISCLOSURE 11 (2016), https://www.acuris.com/assets/Vintage-Group_Newsletter-3-2016_Final-LR.pdf 
(“Many companies now produce separate sustainability or corporate social responsibility reports . . . . But 
sometimes they are selective and basically say, ‘Here are all the nice things we did last year’ – community 
activities, reducing their carbon footprint, and various other things. They don’t necessarily focus on the 
issues that really matter in the context of their industry.”). 
In many cases, issuers simply omit the issues on which their practices 
fall short and reporting metrics that would flag shortcomings.162 
157. See generally Virginia Harper Ho, Nonfinancial Risk Disclosure and the Costs of Private 
Ordering, 55 AM. BUS. L.J. 407, 407 (2018) (arguing that “the current state of sustainability disclosure” 
as implemented through private ordering “is inadequate for investment analysis” and calling for an SEC- 
mandated disclosure requirement). 
158. 
159. See, e.g., Klaus Dingwerth & Margot Eichinger, Tamed Transparency: How Information 
Disclosure Under the Global Reporting Initiative Fails to Empower, 10 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 74, 88 
(2010) (explaining that information in disclosures is “unbalanced” and “of limited practical use”). 
160. See, e.g., Markus J. Milne & Rob Gray, W(h)ither Ecology? The Triple Bottom Line, the Global 
Reporting Initiative, and Corporate Sustainability Reporting, 118 J. BUS. ETHICS 13, 17 (2013) 
(describing the poor quality and incompleteness of many triple bottom line reports, most of which 
“cover few stakeholders” and “cherry pick elements of news and generally ignore the major social issues 
that arise from corporate activity”). 
161. 
162. For example, in Volkswagen’s sustainability reports, the company concentrated heavily on its 
efforts to reduce CO2 emissions and included little discussion of its emissions of NOX, later found to be 
the main pollutant released by Volkswagen’s cars as a result of its emissions-testing modifications. See, 
e.g., Akmaral Zhakypova, Dissecting Corporate Sustainability Reporting: VW Emissions Scandal Case 
22 (2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://nature.berkeley.edu/classes/es196/projects/2016final/ 
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This makes their 
ZhakypovaA_2016.pdf (describing Volkswagen’s discussion of “‘CO2’ or ‘carbon’” and “‘NOX’ or 
‘nitrogen’” in its 2013 and 2014 sustainability reports). 
reports poor tools for assessing the extent to which sustainability issues represent 
material business risks. 
The practice of emphasizing positive and omitting negative information to 
make an issuer’s business practices appear to be more sustainable than they 
actually are is known as “greenwashing.”163 
See, e.g., Bryant Cannon, Student Article, A Plea for Efficiency: The Voluntary Environmental 
Obligations of International Corporations and the Benefits of Information Standardization, 19 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 454, 478 (2012) (“[C]orporate greenwashing allows those companies that falsely, yet 
effectively, portray an image of environmental responsibility to obtain undeserved benefits . . . .”); see 
also Roel Nieuwenkamp, Ever Heard of SDG Washing? The Urgency of SDG Due Diligence, OECD: 
DEV. MATTERS (Sept. 25, 2017), https://oecd-development-matters.org/2017/09/25/ever-heard-of-sdg- 
washing-the-urgency-of-sdg-due-diligence/ [https://perma.cc/UV4H-TR3R] (“[T]he term SDG washing 
points to businesses that use the Sustainable Development Goals to market their positive contribution to 
some SDGs while ignoring their negative impact on others.”). 
Perhaps the most prominent recent 
example of greenwashing was Volkswagen, which was long praised as a global 
leader in corporate social responsibility, based largely on its self-disclosed sus-
tainable practices.164 
See, e.g., Lauren Hepler, Volkswagen and the Dark Side of Corporate Sustainability, GREENBIZ 
(Sept. 24, 2015, 2:00 AM), https://www.greenbiz.com/article/volkswagen-and-dark-side-corporate- 
sustainability [https://perma.cc/P9KQ-2L87] (describing Volkswagen’s recognition for its sustainability 
as “following a pattern of high marks for Volkswagen over the years”). 
In 2015, Volkswagen was named the world’s most sustain-
able car company by the Dow Jones Sustainability Index.165 
See Press Release, Volkswagen U.S. Media Site, Volkswagen is World’s Most Sustainable 
Automotive Group (Sept. 11, 2015), https://media.vw.com/en-us/releases/566 [https://perma.cc/LDH5- 
MG4G] (“The Volkswagen Group has again been listed as the most sustainable automaker in the 
world’s leading sustainability ranking.”); see also Erika Fry, VW Fooled Everyone. Was It the Only 
One?, FORTUNE (Oct. 26, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/10/26/emissions-testing-software-cheat- 
volkswagen-scandal/ [https://perma.cc/4J3L-A4SY] (“In early September the Dow Jones Sustainability 
Index (DJSI) crowned Volkswagen . . . the world’s most sustainable car company.”). 
Just one week later, 
U.S. regulators publicly announced the emissions scandal.166 
Letter from Phillip A. Brooks, Dir., Air Enf’t Div., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to David 
Geanacopoulos, Exec. Vice President, Pub. Affairs & Gen. Counsel, Volkswagen Grp. of Am. & Stuart 
Johnson, Gen. Manager, Eng’g & Envtl. Office, Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Regarding Notice of 
Violation (Sept. 18, 2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-10/documents/vw-nov-caa- 
09-18-15.pdf. Volkswagen subsequently agreed to a $15.3 billion settlement with U.S. regulators. 
Margaret Cronin Fisk et al., Volkswagen Agrees to $15 Billion Diesel-Cheating Settlement, BLOOMBERG 
(June 28, 2016, 5:25 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-28/volkswagen-to-pay- 
14-7-billion-to-settle-u-s-emissions-claims [https://perma.cc/H63V-2ZMM]. 
Voluntary disclosure also tends to be vague, general, or boilerplate, rather than 
providing investors with the specific information that would enable comparison 
of companies’ sustainability practices.167 The corporate desire for generic disclo-
sure is rational—to the extent issuers disclose specifics, investors can more read-
ily identify outliers and pressure a change in their policies. 
163. 
164. 
165. 
166. 
167. See, e.g., Robyn Bishop, Note, Investing in the Future: Why the SEC Should Require a Uniform 
Climate Change Disclosure Framework to Protect Investors and Mitigate U.S. Financial Instability, 48 
ENVTL. L. 491, 500–01 (2018) (explaining that “the majority of climate-related information comes from 
voluntary reporting” and that many companies “currently include a boilerplate disclosure recognizing 
climate change as a risk, but say nothing about its impacts on a particular business”). 
948 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 107:923 
Even when voluntary disclosure is relatively balanced and comprehensive, it 
has other limitations. The absence of standardized disclosure requirements may 
lead issuers to disclose such a high quantity of information that it results in infor-
mation overload.168 Critics have argued that existing securities disclosure require-
ments are so excessive as to flood the markets with so much information that 
investors cannot use the information intelligently;169 but voluntary sustainability 
disclosures are, in many cases, far more extensive than mandatory financial 
disclosures.170 
Because no centralized regulator or authority is responsible for establishing 
disclosure standards, even within a single jurisdiction, sustainability disclosure is 
fragmented rather than standardized. Issuers can choose which metrics or stand-
ards to use for their disclosures and which among those standards to report on. 
The absence of standardization impedes the market’s ability to compare issuer 
sustainability practices, even among similar companies.171 According to one 
study, nearly eighty percent of investors were dissatisfied with the “comparability 
of sustainability reporting between companies in the same industry.”172 
DELOITTE, SUSTAINABILITY DISCLOSURE: GETTING AHEAD OF THE CURVE 5 (2016), https:// 
www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/risk/us-risk-sustainability-disclosure.pdf. 
In 
another, only eight percent of investors polled believed that “existing ESG disclo-
sures allow for comparison across companies/peers.”173 
Although third-party ratings and rankings attempt to address the comparability 
issue, they suffer from some of the same defects,174 including limitations in cov-
erage, differences in the information used, and heavy reliance on issuer-supplied 
information.175 In addition, rating agencies do not produce consistent results, pre-
sumably due in part to methodological differences. An analysis comparing “three 
of the most well-known and [publicly] available CSR rankings published in 
2015: Newsweek, Forbes, and CSR Magazine Global” found that only twelve  
168. One commentator describes this practice, in the context of sustainability disclosures to 
consumers, as “information flooding,” warning that it enables issuers to bury or even omit bad facts. 
Karen Bradshaw Schulz, Information Flooding, 48 IND. L. REV. 755, 756 (2015). 
169. Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for 
Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 419, 443 (2003). 
170. See supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text (describing length of voluntary sustainability reports). 
171. Comparability of disclosures is a critical attribute for investors’ ability to use those disclosures 
effectively. Cf. Letter from Amy C. McGarrity, Chief Inv. Officer, Colo. PERA to Jay Clayton, 
Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n & Russell G. Golden, Chairman, Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 
(Mar. 16, 2018) (on file with author) (expressing concern over lack of comparability among non-GAAP 
measures of financial performance and calling for the SEC to undertake a standardization project). 
172. 
173. SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 50, at 6. 
174. Because third-party ratings appear to be independent, they can be highly influential, making 
their unreliability and inconsistency particularly problematic. The influence of credit rating agencies 
prior to the 2008 financial crisis offers a warning. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, What’s (Still) Wrong with 
Credit Ratings?, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1407, 1410, 1412 (2017) (discussing the contribution of credit 
ratings to the financial crisis). 
175. As noted, see supra notes 164–66 and accompanying text. Volkswagen successfully concealed 
car emissions not just from regulators and consumers but also the DJSI, which named Volkswagen the 
world’s most sustainable car company in 2015, just before news of the emissions scandal broke. 
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percent of companies appeared on all three lists.176 
Beixin (Betsy) Lin et al., Are Sustainability Rankings Consistent Across Ratings Agencies?, 
CPA J. (July 2017), https://www.cpajournal.com/2017/07/19/sustainability-rankings-consistent-across- 
ratings-agencies/ [https://perma.cc/XFZ3-BN4D]. 
A Wall Street Journal study 
noted similar disagreement among the “four leading ESG ratings providers,” find-
ing they came to completely different conclusions “about what makes a company 
a ‘sustainable’ investment.”177 
Jon Sindreu & Sarah Kent, Why It’s So Hard to Be an ‘Ethical’ Investor, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 1, 
2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-its-so-hard-to-be-an-ethical-investor-1535799601? 
mod=?mod=itp&mod=djemITP_h [https://perma.cc/K7EH-EBUG]. 
As another Wall Street Journal explained, despite 
these inconsistencies, ESG ratings “are used as though they were some sort of 
objective truth,” although “[i]n reality they are no more than a series of judgments 
by the scoring companies about what matters.”178 
James Mackintosh, Is Tesla or Exxon More Sustainable? It Depends Whom You Ask, WALL ST. 
J. (Sept. 17, 2018, 11:58 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/is-tesla-or-exxon-more-sustainable-it- 
depends-whom-you-ask-1537199931 [https://perma.cc/5347-J3UP]. 
Finally, sustainability reporting is not reliable. As noted, such reporting mostly 
occurs in standalone reports that are not integrated with the issuer’s securities fil-
ings. These reports are often prepared by public relations or marketing personnel 
and, as a result, contain disclosures that do not meet the standards applied to 
securities filings. Furthermore, they are not routinely prepared or reviewed by dis-
closure lawyers, reviewed or certified by the CEO or board of directors, or subject 
to the oversight of third-party auditors. Finally, unlike securities filings, sustain-
ability reports are not filed with and reviewed by the SEC. Although, in theory, 
sustainability reports are public disclosures, it is unclear whether greenwashing 
or other false disclosures in these reports would subject the issuer to liability for 
federal securities fraud.179 As a result, issuers may take less care in the prepara-
tion of their sustainability disclosures. 
These limitations in the existing framework are behind investors’ demands for 
an SEC rule that mandates sustainability reporting. Investors that value sustain-
ability considerations as relevant to economic performance, as well as those that 
wish to explore the question of their relevance, need quality information. 
Significantly, sustainability information is important for an evaluation of issues 
such as board oversight, risk management, and business practices, regardless of 
the extent to which investors believe an issuer should focus on sustainability in 
business decisions.180 Moreover, if sustainability disclosures relate to issues such 
as financial performance and risk management, those disclosures should be 
176. 
177. 
178. 
179. See Donald C. Langevoort, Disasters & Disclosures: Securities Fraud Liability in the Shadow 
of a Corporate Catastrophe, 107 GEO. L.J. 967, 974 (2019) (questioning whether compliance with 
voluntary disclosure standards can create an affirmative duty to disclose, thereby subjecting issuers 
failing to do so to liability for fraud); Cadesby B. Cooper, Note, Rule 10b-5 at the Intersection of 
Greenwash and Green Investment: The Problem of Economic Loss, 42 B.C. ENVTL. AFFS. L. REV. 405, 
408 (2015) (exploring the answer to this question as depending in part on the extent to which the 
misrepresentations “involve information bearing on the future expected cash flows of the company”). 
180. This Article does not take a position on the normative question of the extent to which corporate 
decisionmaking should reflect sustainability considerations or, if so, which sustainability issues it should 
address. 
950 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 107:923 
integrated into investor-oriented disclosure documents rather than provided in 
separate reports as in current practice. Integration would have the added benefit 
of increasing interfirm comparability and reducing wasteful and duplicative 
search costs. Critically, SEC action is necessary because investors are allocating 
capital and businesses are basing operational decisions on sustainability informa-
tion that is unreliable. As a result, the economic value of sustainability practices 
cannot be assessed effectively. 
However, the challenge in adopting a disclosure mandate for sustainability 
within the existing securities disclosure framework is in the implementation. As 
noted, commentators have called for sustainability reporting to address a wide 
range of issues,181 but the applicability of any specific issue varies by issuer and 
industry.182 In addition, sustainability is a moving target, meaning that the issues 
that arguably warrant disclosure and their importance continue to evolve. 
Because of these characteristics, designing a line-item series of disclosures to 
address sustainability is likely unworkable, and a principles-based approach 
appears more appropriate. 
The SEC’s materiality standard is arguably a principles-based requirement in 
that, to the extent sustainability issues are material to the existing mandated dis-
closure items—such as an issuer’s business plan, financial operations, risk fac-
tors, or litigation risk—disclosure of those issues is required. This approach, 
however, does little to encourage either affirmative disclosures or issuer attention 
to determining whether sustainability issues are economically significant. In other 
words, an additional value to an affirmative disclosure requirement is its ability to 
focus board and management attention on acquiring information and exercising 
oversight. 
This benefit can be analogized to that provided by the CEO and CFO certifica-
tion requirement established by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX).183 
Section 302 of SOX requires the CEOs and CFOs of public companies personally 
to certify that the reports filed by their companies with the SEC are both accurate 
and complete.184 Among the statute’s requirements are that the certifying officers 
establish, maintain, and evaluate the effectiveness of the company’s internal con-
trols.185 False certifications subject officers to potential liability in an SEC 
enforcement action, as well as to criminal liability.186 SOX also contains a  
181. See Brown, supra note 34 (describing various calls for expanded sustainability disclosure). 
182. See generally U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 12 (describing industry-specific MD&A 
factors). 
183. Compare SEC General Rules and Regulations, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-15, 240.15d-15 (2018), 
with Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) § 302(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2012). 
184. SOX § 302(a). 
185. Id. 
186. SOX § 906, 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012), imposes criminal liability. See also Erin Massey Everitt, 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s Officer Certification Requirements—Has Increased Accountability Equaled 
Increased Liability?, 6 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 225, 244–45 (2008) (discussing criminal and 
enforcement liability). Notably, the provision does not contain a private right of action. Id. at 235–36. 
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provision requiring executives to forfeit incentive compensation and bonuses if 
their companies must restate their financial statements due to fraud or accounting 
errors.187 
Enforcing the SOX certification requirement presents a challenge. Some com-
mentators have characterized the SEC’s limited enforcement efforts as “worri-
some and problematic,”188 or have criticized the failure of the provisions 
themselves to impose liability on private plaintiffs.189 On the other hand, there is 
widespread evidence of the certification requirement’s effectiveness in encourag-
ing corporate executives to be more engaged in their company’s financial report-
ing and more proactive in seeking out the information necessary to engage in 
better oversight.190 In the next Part, this Article offers a proposal for sustainability 
disclosure designed to encourage greater information flow and board oversight 
akin to the rationale behind SOX section 302. In the following Part, the Article 
addresses enforcement of the proposal. 
III. SD&A: A PROPOSED APPROACH FOR MANDATED SUSTAINABILITY DISCLOSURE 
This Article proposes that the SEC implement a new disclosure requirement of 
sustainability discussion and analysis as part of Regulation S–K, thereby requir-
ing issuers to include SD&A reporting as part of their annual reports.191 
This Article’s proposal for issuers to include a narrative discussion of sustainability issues in the 
annual report is highly workable. Indeed, Salesforce voluntarily introduced a discussion of 
environmental, social, and governance information in its 2018 Annual Report. Salesforce, Annual 
Report 64–65 (Form 10–K) (Feb. 28, 2018), https://s1.q4cdn.com/454432842/files/doc_financials/2018/ 
Salesforce-FY18-Annual-Report.pdf. 
The 
SD&A requirement is modeled on the existing MD&A and CD&A reporting 
requirements, which are described in this first section of this Part. In the second 
section, this Part then describes the details of the SD&A proposal, including sev-
eral modifications to the MD&A and CD&A models that both address the speci-
alized issues implicit in sustainability disclosure and enhance the effectiveness of 
the requirement.192 
187. SOX § 304(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a). 
188. Allison List, Note, The Lax Enforcement of Section 304 of Sarbanes-Oxley: Why Is the SEC 
Ignoring Its Greatest Asset in the Fight Against Corporate Misconduct?, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 195, 218 
(2009). 
189. Everitt, supra note 186, at 235–36. 
190. See id. at 245 (“The officer certification requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act have proven 
quite effective at prompting executives of publicly traded companies to become more engaged in the 
financial reporting process.”). 
191. 
192. To the extent that the SEC determines that the SD&A requirement will impose significant new 
oversight costs on issuers, it may decide to implement the requirement on a delayed or tiered basis for 
smaller issuers or emerging growth companies. This approach would resemble that taken by the JOBS 
Act, which exempts emerging growth companies from some of Dodd–Frank’s disclosure requirements 
with respect to executive compensation as well as the non-binding shareholder vote on such 
compensation. See, e.g., Amy Coleman, Note, A Plague of Locusts: The JOBS Act as Foe More than 
Friend, 16 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 43, 61 (2013) (“[The JOBS Act] negates the separate shareholder vote for 
executive compensation and the disclosure of executive compensation for median employee income 
requirement set by Dodd-Frank.”). 
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A. MD&A AND CD&A: THE MODELS FOR AN SD&A REQUIREMENT 
The SD&A requirement is modeled on two existing narrative disclosure frame-
works: Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) and Compensation 
Discussion and Analysis (CD&A). The MD&A disclosure requirement—contained 
in Item 303 of Regulation S–K and SEC Interpretive Release Number 6835—was 
adopted specifically to supplement the line-item disclosures with more flexible and 
company-specific disclosures.193 As the SEC explained, 
The Commission has long recognized the need for a narrative explanation of 
the financial statements, because a numerical presentation and brief accompa-
nying footnotes alone may be insufficient for an investor to judge the quality 
of earnings and the likelihood that past performance is indicative of future per-
formance. MD&A is intended to give the investor an opportunity to look at the 
company through the eyes of management by providing both a short and long- 
term analysis of the business of the company. The Item asks management to 
discuss the dynamics of the business and to analyze the financials.194 
Importantly, Item 303 creates an affirmative and nonspecific duty to disclose 
material information when management knows of a trend, demand, commitment, 
or uncertainty.195 In adopting Item 303, the SEC explicitly disclaimed the appli-
cation of the court-adopted definition of materiality.196 Instead, in its 1989 
Release, the SEC issued the following guidance: “A disclosure duty exists where 
a trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty is both presently known to 
management and reasonably likely to have material effects on the registrant’s fi-
nancial condition or results of operation.”197 
The SEC went on to explain that that, when management knows of a trend, 
demand, commitment, event, or uncertainty, it must “make two assessments”: 
(1) 
 
Is the known trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty likely to 
come to fruition? If management determines that it is not reasonably likely 
to occur, no disclosure is required. 
(2) If management cannot make that determination, it must evaluate objec-
tively the consequences of the known trend, demand, commitment, event 
193. Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations; 
Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Securities Act Release No. 6835, Exchange Act Release No. 
26,831, Investment Company Act Release No. 16,961, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427, 22,436 (May 24, 1989); see 
also id. at 22,427–28 (summarizing the background of the MD&A disclosure requirement). 
194. Concept Release on Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and 
Operations, Securities Act Release No. 6711, Exchange Act Release No. 24,356, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,715, 
13,717 (proposed Apr. 24, 1987). 
195. Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations; 
Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Securities Act Release No. 6835, Exchange Act Release No. 
26,831, Investment Company Act Release No. 16,961, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427, 22,429 (May 24, 1989). 
196. See id. at 22,430 n.27 (“The probability/magnitude test for materiality approved by the Supreme 
Court in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988), is inapposite to Item 303 disclosure.”). 
197. Id. at 22,429. 
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or uncertainty, on the assumption that it will come to fruition. Disclosure 
is then required unless management determines that a material effect on 
the registrant’s financial condition or results of operations is not reason-
ably likely to occur.198 
Id. at 22,430. Former SEC Commissioner Edward H. Fleischman stated that the “reasonably 
likely” standard “suggests a likelihood of about forty percent.” Mark S. Croft, MD&A: The Tightrope of 
Disclosure, 45 S.C. L. REV. 477, 485 (1994) (citing Edward H. Fleischman, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, The Intersection of Business Needs and Disclosure Requirements: MD&A, Address to the 
Eleventh Annual Southern Securities Institute (Mar. 1, 1991), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1991/ 
030191fleischman.pdf). 
The importance of MD&A disclosure continues to grow. As explained in one 
article, “[T]he MD&A is fast becoming the primary disclosure vehicle for man-
agement to relate its unique insider’s critique of the registrant’s financial per-
formance and operations to help predict future performance.”199 Another explains 
that “[t]oday, the MD&A is widely considered to be the primary form of narrative 
disclosure that is reviewed, together with financial statements, for investment de-
cision making.”200 On the other hand, the vague and flexible standard makes the 
requirement difficult for issuers to comply with.201 In one high-profile case, the 
SEC brought an enforcement action against Caterpillar for failing to disclose, in 
its MD&A, the importance of its Brazilian subsidiary to the firm’s financial 
results and the likely impact of political changes in Brazil on future results.202 
Caterpillar has been characterized a “message case” indicating that the SEC 
intends to require improved disclosure.203 
The CD&A is a more recent disclosure requirement, modeled on the MD&A. 
The SEC adopted the CD&A requirement in 2006 as part of its executive com-
pensation disclosure reforms.204 Issuers are required to provide the CD&A as part  
198. 
199. John W. Bagby, Paula C. Murray & Eric T. Andrews, How Green Was My Balance Sheet?: 
Corporate Liability and Environmental Disclosure, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 225, 299 (1995). 
200. Henry T.C. Hu, Disclosure Universes and Modes of Information: Banks, Innovation, and 
Divergent Regulatory Quests, 31 YALE J. REG. 565, 594 (2014). 
201. See Rick E. Hansen, Climate Change Disclosure by SEC Registrants: Revisiting the SEC’s 2010 
Interpretive Release, 6 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 487, 495 (2012) (“[C]rafting an MD&A that is 
responsive to the SEC’s rules is arguably among the most difficult aspects of preparing a quarterly or 
annual report and has prompted the SEC to issue MD&A-specific guidance on several occasions.”). 
202. In re Caterpillar, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 30,532, [1992 Transfer Binder] 7 Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 73,830 (Mar. 31, 1992). Notably, the SEC’s enforcement action was based on section 13(a) 
of the Exchange Act, not the antifraud provision. See id. 
203. Suzanne J. Romajas, Note, The Duty to Disclose Forward-Looking Information: A Look at the 
Future of MD&A, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 245, 258 (1993). 
204. See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 
8732A, Exchange Act Release No. 54,302A, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,444A, 71 Fed. 
Reg. 53,158, 53,164 (Sept. 8, 2006) (“We are adopting a new Compensation Discussion and Analysis 
Section.”). Jeffrey Gordon, a Columbia law professor, argued in a 2005 law review article that “the SEC 
should require proxy disclosure of a ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’ statement (CD&A) signed 
by the members of the compensation committee.” Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation: If 
There’s a Problem, What’s the Remedy? The Case for “Compensation Discussion and Analysis,” 30 J. 
CORP. L. 675, 677 (2005). 
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of their executive compensation disclosure in the proxy statement.205 
The CD&A is intended “to provide to investors material information that is 
necessary to an understanding of the [company’s] compensation policies and 
decisions,”206 focusing on “the most important factors relevant to analysis of 
those policies and decisions.”207 Specifically, the CD&A is intended to be princi-
ples-based and to avoid boilerplate.208 Item 402, the SEC rule that governs execu-
tive compensation disclosure, sets out the requirements for the CD&A in two 
ways. First, Item 402(b)(1) lists a variety of “mandatory principles-based topics” 
that issuers must address.209 The rule identifies a variety of components of the 
required CD&A disclosure, including the objectives of the compensation pro-
gram and how each element of compensation is determined.210 Item 402(b)(2) 
then acknowledges that “the material information to be disclosed under 
Compensation Discussion and Analysis will vary depending upon the facts and 
circumstances,”211 and lists fifteen “examples” of “material information” that 
may be included in the CD&A.212 
Both the MD&A and CD&A disclosures are primarily principles-based. As 
such, they offer flexibility that both permits tailoring the disclosures to the 
issuer’s particular circumstances and allows the disclosures to evolve in response 
to changes in issuer and market conditions. As the SEC staff explained with 
respect to its MD&A requirement: “[T]he flexible nature of this requirement has 
resulted in disclosures that keep pace with the evolving nature of business trends 
without the need to continuously amend the text of the rule.”213 
The flexibility of the existing MD&A and CD&A disclosures is a primary rea-
son to use them as the model for an SD&A requirement. At the same time, these 
disclosures suffer from several disadvantages relative to line-item disclosure 
requirements.214 First, because they are premised on a materiality determination 
by management, the disclosures offer management substantial discretion that is 
205. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Item 8(b) (2018) (setting forth the required disclosure of the 
compensation of directors and executive officers). The details of the CD&A requirement are included in 
id. § 229.402(b)(1), which is cross-referenced in Regulation 14A. 
206. Id. § 229.402, Instructions to Item 402(b), ¶ 1. 
207. Id. ¶ 3. 
208. See id. (noting that the CD&A “should focus on the material principles underlying the 
registrant’s executive compensation policies and decisions and the most important factors relevant to 
analysis of those policies and decisions” and “shall avoid boilerplate language”). 
209. Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation, 
Securities Act Release No. 9178, Exchange Act Release No. 63,768, 76 Fed. Reg. 6010, 6015 & n.76 
(Feb. 2, 2011). 
210. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(b)(1) (2018). 
211. Id. § 229.402(b)(2). 
212. Id. 
213. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Securities Act 
Release No. 9106, Exchange Act Release No. 61,469, 75 Fed. Reg. 6289, 6294 (Feb. 8, 2010). 
214. See generally Brief of Professors at Law and Business Schools as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, Leidos, Inc. v. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. 1395 (2017) (No. 16-581), 2017 WL 
8291737 [hereinafter Leidos Amicus Brief] (detailing the shortcomings of the MD&A requirement in 
providing meaningful information). 
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often exercised in favor of failing to disclose. Even well-meaning insiders may 
evaluate the materiality standard differently. Second, the disclosures are not as 
readily comparable as quantitative disclosure requirements. The SEC itself has 
criticized existing MD&A disclosure as “less detailed” than desired and in need 
of “greater analysis” and “additional explanation.”215 One SEC official offered 
the view that “in too many MD&As . . . . [t]here is too much elevator music, and 
not enough really useful analysis.”216 
Alan L. Beller, Remarks Before the SEC Historical Society at The Roundtable on the 
Integration of the 1933 and 1934 Acts 126 (Mar. 21, 2002), http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-5e13d29c4c0 
16cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/programs/int1933_1934Transcript.pdf. 
As a result, it is worth considering whether, 
in adopting the MD&A model for sustainability disclosure, that model can be 
refined to enhance its effectiveness. 
B. THE SD&A PROPOSAL 
The SD&A requirement proposed by this Article would require issuers to 
include a discussion of sustainability in their annual financial reporting. Issuers 
would be required, in their SD&A, to identify and explain the three sustainability 
issues most significant to their operations.217 The required disclosure would include 
a discussion of the potential impact of those sustainability issues on the issuer’s 
economic performance,218 as well as an explanation of the basis for the issuer’s 
determination of significance.219 
Robert Eccles and Tim Youmans have proposed that boards voluntarily issue a sustainability 
statement in their annual reports through what they term a “Statement of Significant Audiences and 
Materiality.” Robert G. Eccles & Tim Youmans, Materiality in Corporate Governance: The Statement 
of Significant Audiences and Materiality 6 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 16-023, 2015), 
https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/16-023_f29dce5d-cbac-4840-8d5f-32b21e6f644e. 
pdf. Like the SD&A, the Eccles and Youmans statement would increase board involvement in and 
oversight of sustainability issues, but their proposal differs from the one developed in this Article in 
several key aspects, including perhaps most importantly its focus on stakeholder significance. See id. 
at 1, 6. 
Analogous to the MD&A, the SD&A disclosure 
would be premised on known risks, trends, and opportunities, in that the require-
ment would be framed in terms of known or reasonably knowable sustainability 
issues. This would include risks, trends, and opportunities that, in the opinion of the 
board of directors, are material to the issuers’ business plan or operations. 
215. Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S–K, Securities Act Release No. 
10,064, Exchange Act Release No. 77,599, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,916, 23,946–47 (proposed Apr. 22, 2016). 
216. 
217. Although this requirement may seem arbitrary, including three sustainability issues is a cost- 
effective way of capturing the most significant risks without making the disclosure requirement unduly 
burdensome. Anecdotal evidence suggests that it also reflects existing practice. For example, at a 
September 2018 public program, NYU Law’s Investors and ESG Conference, a high-level public 
company executive identified three primary subjects in discussing his corporation’s approach to 
sustainability. 
218. This proposal focuses on sustainability that is “internal” in the sense that it is focused on the 
issuer’s operational practices and not on an issuer’s engagement efforts aimed at general societal 
improvements such as volunteerism or donating to charity. Some commentators have distinguished 
between internal and external CSR, although the use of these terms varies. See, e.g., Olga Hawn & 
Ioannis Ioannou, Mind the Gap: The Interplay Between External and Internal Actions in the Case of 
Corporate Social Responsibility, 37 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 2569 (2016) (empirically analyzing issuer 
engagement in internal and external CSR as well as the gap between external and internal actions). 
219. 
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The requirement that issuers identify and discuss the three most significant sus-
tainability issues responds to the range of challenges that have been brought 
against mandated sustainability disclosure.220 By requiring the SD&A to focus on 
the specific issues that are most important to a particular issuer’s operations, the 
proposal addresses the difficulty in articulating a precise definition of materiality 
or determining an appropriate materiality standard. Although the SD&A does not 
provide a comprehensive level of disclosure, it is a workable starting point that 
enables boards and investors to identify and evaluate those practices most likely 
to have a substantial economic impact. In addition, as discussed further in the 
pages that follow, a requirement that issuers disclose the three most material 
issues reduces the potentially burdensome impact associated with a more ambi-
tious disclosure requirement, while providing more objectivity than the generic 
but un-cabined materiality standard currently reflected in the SEC’s approach to 
MD&A disclosure. Thus, the proposal is arguably superior to a standard that 
would require disclosure of all material sustainability issues or condition disclo-
sure requirements in terms of a minimum dollar threshold of anticipated eco-
nomic impact.221 
The proposal contemplates that the SEC’s adopting release would provide 
additional guidance with respect to the nature and scope of sustainability issues, 
similar to the guidance it provided for CD&A. Specifically, the guidance would 
identify the range of topics that have been identified within the framework of sus-
tainability, such as “climate change, resource scarcity, corporate social responsi-
bility, and good corporate citizenship,”222 but would note that the identification of 
material sustainability issues is industry- and issuer-specific. The release would 
also note that the materiality of specific sustainability issues can evolve over time 
and is a product of a variety of considerations, including the relevance of the issue 
to earnings quality and volatility, reputational and regulatory risk, and the quality 
of board oversight and internal controls. 
The SD&A proposal would modify the guidelines of Item 303 to place respon-
sibility for the determination of what sustainability issues require disclosure in  
220. Because the SD&A requirement would not require issuers to adhere to specific language in 
characterizing their sustainability practices, it is also consistent with the First Amendment concerns 
expressed in the D.C. Circuit’s decision on conflict minerals disclosure, holding that the requirement 
that issuers certify their products as “not . . . found to be ‘DRC conflict free’” violated the First 
Amendment. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 373 (D.C. Cir. 2014), aff’d on reh’g, 800 F.3d 
518 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
221. Such an alternative approach could provide, for example, that trends or risks that the board 
estimates are reasonably likely to affect revenues by more than one million dollars annually are 
presumptively material. This guidance would be roughly analogous to Item 404’s disclosure 
requirement for related party transactions, which requires disclosure of all such transactions in which the 
amount involved exceeds $120,000. 17 C.F.R. § 229.404(a) (2018). Given the difficulty of ascertaining 
the impact of ESG considerations, this Article takes the position that such an approach is less workable. 
222. Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S–K, Securities Act Release No. 
10,064, Exchange Act Release No. 77,599, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,916, 23,970 (proposed Apr. 22, 2016). 
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the hands of the board of directors, rather than management.223 This is consistent 
with one of the main reasons proffered by investors for requiring sustainability 
disclosure: that such disclosure provides them with valuable insight into the 
board’s familiarity with and oversight of critical issues such as risk management. 
In addition, the SEC recently highlighted the expertise of the board in evaluating 
the significance of particular issues to the company’s business.224 
See, e.g., Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14I (CF), U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Nov. 1, 2017), https:// 
www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14i.htm [https://perma.cc/RZL5-TUA2] (observing that, in the context 
of determining the application of the ordinary business exemption to shareholder proposals, “[a] board 
acting in this capacity and with the knowledge of the company’s business and the implications for a 
particular proposal on that company’s business is well situated to analyze, determine and explain 
whether a particular issue is sufficiently significant”). 
The board or a 
sustainability committee of the board225 would also be required to sign the 
SD&A.226 Like the CEO and CFO certification requirements of Sarbanes–Oxley, 
the certification requirement would encourage issuers to develop systems for col-
lecting and communicating the information necessary for the board to meet this 
obligation.227 
The rationale for requiring both board responsibility and certification is to 
ensure that the process of preparing the SD&A enhances the board’s role in 
understanding and overseeing the issuer’s sustainability practices. From an 
investor’s perspective, the key issues are whether the directors are aware of the 
sustainability issues that may materially affect the issuer’s operations and 
whether they have incorporated those issues into their strategic planning and 
oversight. Placing specific responsibility on directors enables investors to 
ensure that the board is performing this role and to hold the board accountable 
for doing so. 
Finally, as detailed later, this Article contemplates that the SD&A requirement 
would be enforced through a combination of public and private enforcement. The 
SEC staff would review and comment on issuers’ SD&A disclosures as part of its 
review of securities filings and would have the authority to bring enforcement 
223. This board-centered approach follows that of India, which, through legislation, placed primary 
responsibility for development and oversight of an issuer’s CSR policy in the board of directors. See 
Afsharipour, supra note 118, at 101–04 (discussing India’s approach). This Article’s focus on the 
board’s role is limited to disclosure oversight, with the expectation that such oversight would broaden 
the information available to the board for purposes of risk management and strategic planning. 
224. 
225. See, e.g., Jayne W. Barnard, At the Intersection of Corporate Governance and Environmental 
Sustainability, 2 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 207, 207 (2011) (articulating “several advantages to having 
a board-level sustainability committee”). 
226. This requirement was part of Jeffrey Gordon’s proposal for CD&A but was not adopted. See 
Gordon, supra note 204, at 695 (“This CD&A should . . . be signed by the members of the committee (or 
the independent directors, as the case may be).”). 
227. See, e.g., Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the Sarbanes- 
Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for Policymakers Too, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 251, 266 (2005) (“[A] fair 
number of public company CEOs have already expressed the view that the process of getting ready for 
section 404 attestation has helped them improve their management information systems.”); see also 
Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack Corporate Governance: How Wise is 
the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843, 1898–1907 (2007) (discussing the impact of Sarbanes– 
Oxley’s certification requirements). 
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actions against issuers and individual directors for failure to comply.228 In addi-
tion, fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions in an issuer’s SD&A would be 
actionable under Rule 10b-5,229 and shareholders could, in appropriate cases, pur-
sue private litigation.230 
IV. ADVANTAGES AND LIMITATIONS OF SD&A 
This Part identifies the key advantages of the SD&A proposal as well as the 
principal potential objections. Importantly, SD&A is a modest starting point for 
sustainability disclosure, and the proposal advanced in this Article is intended as 
a first step that will enable issuers, investors, and regulators to asses the utility of 
sustainability disclosure and provide data to evaluate claims of the relationship of 
sustainability to economic value. This Article does not make the claim that the 
SD&A will provide investors and the markets with comprehensive sustainability 
information or that it will or should displace existing voluntary disclosure 
regimes. Rather, for the reasons set out in the sections that follow, integrating sus-
tainability disclosure into traditional financial reporting provides several 
advantages. 
A. THE SD&A PROPOSAL IS A WORKABLE FIRST STEP 
A key advantage to the SD&A proposal is its workability. One of the chal-
lenges in formulating a mandatory sustainability disclosure requirement is that 
the topic of sustainability is vast and open-ended. Private organizations such as 
GRI and SASB have identified dozens of disclosure items, and current sustain-
ability reports commonly exceed one hundred pages in length. The cost of devel-
oping and complying with comparable mandatory disclosure requirements would 
place a heavy burden on issuers.231 
Cf. Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the Economic Club of New 
York (July 12, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/remarks-economic-club-new-york [https:// 
perma.cc/T2EW-YDPZ] (“There are circumstances in which the Commission’s reporting rules may 
require publicly traded companies to make disclosures that are burdensome to generate, but may not be 
material to the total mix of information available to investors.”). 
As a result, issuers might reasonably question 
the extent to which specific disclosure issues were relevant to their operations. 
And the utility of such extensive disclosures for investors—for whom the overall 
volume of mandatory disclosure is already overwhelming—is questionable.232 
Increasing the number of issues addressed, requiring issuers to provide hard 
sustainability data, and formulating line-item disclosure requirements would 
228. The mandatory nature of the SD&A requirement is critical for enhancing comparability and 
incentivizing the board to take its responsibility seriously. Cf. Eccles & Youmans, supra note 219, at 8 
(proposing to mobilize investors to “ask company boards to issue The Statement”). For the reasons 
previously detailed, this Article takes the view that boards will be unwilling to provide meaningful 
sustainability information in the financial statements unless required to do so. 
229. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018). 
230. See generally Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation, 
2009 WIS. L. REV. 333 (discussing private securities fraud litigation). 
231. 
232. See, e.g., id.; Paredes, supra note 169 (explaining how increasing the quantity of required 
disclosures reduces their value to investors). 
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potentially increase the informational content of sustainability disclosure. That 
increase would come, however, at a substantial cost both to issuers preparing the 
information and to investors relying on it. Instead, the SD&A proposal offers a 
balance between informational value and workability. In particular, the require-
ment that issuers determine which sustainability issues are most important 
and explain the basis for their determination might reduce the propensity of 
issuers to engage in duplicative or boilerplate disclosure that is likely to be 
uninformative.233 
But see INV’R RESPONSIBILITY RES. CTR. INST., THE CORPORATE RISK FACTOR DISCLOSURE 
LANDSCAPE 3 (2016), https://www.weinberg.udel.edu/IIRCiResearchDocuments/2016/01/FINAL-EY- 
Risk-Disclosure-Study.pdf (criticizing the narrative format of the risk-factor disclosure requirement as 
“tend[ing] to represent a listing of generic risks, with little to help investors distinguish between the 
relative importance of each risk to the company”). 
In addition, a more comprehensive disclosure requirement would embroil 
issuers and regulators in difficult determinations of the appropriate scope of dis-
closure. It would force regulators to assess which sustainability issues warrant 
line-item disclosure requirements and to evaluate contested claims about the eco-
nomic materiality of the required information. At the same time, it would exacer-
bate the risk of information overload by requiring issuers to provide extensive 
boilerplate disclosures rather than identifying the specific issues on which invest-
ors should focus. 
The SD&A requirement creates an explicit, although limited, affirmative 
reporting obligation rather than simply leaving sustainability issues within the 
ambiguous materiality assessment applicable to an issuer’s overall MD&A and 
risk-factor disclosure. As the previous discussion demonstrates, it is a mistake to 
attempt to load sustainability disclosure into these general disclosure frameworks, 
and the SEC’s decision to do so has had the effect of unduly limiting both issuer 
consideration and disclosure of sustainability issues. At the same time, the man-
date would have the practical effect of requiring issuers to examine and evaluate 
the impact of a broader range of sustainability issues than those covered by the 
three most significant mandated disclosures, because this evaluation would be 
necessary to determine which issues to disclose. Accordingly, the proposal’s 
effect on information reporting and board oversight would be substantially 
greater than requiring the company to consider just three disclosure items. 
The SEC’s adoption of an SD&A requirement would reverse its prior position 
that distinguished sustainability issues from financial performance and encourage 
a norm in which issuers and their boards view sustainability considerations as 
part of their operational strategy. It would also encourage the evaluation of sus-
tainability factors from a financial perspective. 
Finally, a sustainability disclosure requirement is a way of managing expecta-
tions. Although a wide range of sustainability issues may be relevant to investors, 
formalizing the type and quantity of such disclosure that is required enhances pre-
dictability and investor confidence. Moreover, there is evidence that qualitative 
disclosure can provide substantial value to the market. For example, a recent 
233. 
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empirical study of the effect of the SEC’s 2005 mandate that firms include a “risk 
factor” section in their annual reports found that, contrary to the assertions of crit-
ics, “managers provide useful risk factor disclosures and investors incorporate 
this information into market values.”234 
B. SD&A REPORTING WILL PROMOTE COMPARABILITY 
In addition, the SD&A proposal will promote the comparability of sustainabil-
ity disclosure. Concededly, a disclosure obligation that admits to issuer-specific 
variation offers less comparability than a set of one-size-fits-all disclosure 
requirements. Because each issuer’s board determines the most significant sus-
tainability issues independently, there is likely to be substantial variation among 
the issues addressed. As a result, the market may learn little by comparing, for 
instance, Volkswagen’s discussion of emissions with PepsiCo’s discussion of 
water conservation. At the same time, including sustainability disclosures within 
an issuer’s securities filings and subjecting those disclosures to SEC staff review 
and comment is likely to have a significant effect on comparability. The SEC staff 
currently reviews more than half of issuer 10–Ks filed each year.235 The SEC’s 
comments focus on not just the hard numbers in the 10–K but also the narrative 
components—the MD&A, CD&A, and the staff review subjects these disclosures 
to meaningful scrutiny.236 
In addition, although only a small percentage of those 10–Ks receive staff com-
ment letters, a variety of industry participants review the letters and report to 
issuers on trends in SEC policies and concerns with respect to 10–K disclosure.237 
See, e.g., id. (describing trends in SEC comment letters); DELOITTE, SEC COMMENT LETTERS — 
INCLUDING INDUSTRY INSIGHTS: WHAT “EDGAR” TOLD US, at viii (9th ed. 2015), https://www2.deloitte. 
com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/audit/us-aers-sec-comment-letters-including-industry-insights- 
what-edgar-told-us-102015.pdf (reporting the top ten topics discussed in SEC comment letters). 
These reports and the SEC reviews themselves lead to revisions and refinements 
of the narrative disclosures in the MD&A and CD&A.238 
See ELIZABETH A. ISING ET AL., DONNELLEY FIN. SOLS., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
DISCLOSURE HANDBOOK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE SEC’S EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION DISCLOSURE 
RULES 12 (rev. ed. 2016), https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/documents/publications/ 
Ising-Mueller-Hanvey-Executive-Compensation-Disclosure-Handbook-Donnelley-Financial-Solutions- 
Oct-2016.pdf (“[C]ompanies are increasingly seeing their peers make favorable changes to their 
disclosures and, regardless of prior say-on-pay votes, those that see this may be inclined to take a fresh 
look at their own CD&A simply to avoid falling behind.”). 
This review process is 
likely to generate common disclosure policies among issuers, particularly for 
those in the same or related industries.239 In particular, because the SEC staff  
234. John L. Campbell et al., The Information Content of Mandatory Risk Factor Disclosures in 
Corporate Filings, 19 REV. ACCT. STUD. 396, 439 (2014). 
235. ERNST & YOUNG, SEC REPORTING UPDATE: 2017 TRENDS IN SEC COMMENT LETTERS 5 (2017). 
236. Cf. id. at 6–7 (reporting that in 2016 and 2017, comments on the MD&A represented forty-three 
percent of comments overall). 
237. 
238. 
239. See generally Stephen V. Brown et al., The Spillover Effect of SEC Comment Letters on 
Qualitative Corporate Disclosure: Evidence from the Risk Factor Disclosure, 35 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 
622 (2018) (documenting the spillover effect on the disclosures made by companies in related 
industries). 
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have access to all issuers’ disclosures, they will be able to identify situations in 
which an issuer has not addressed a subject apparently important to its peer firms 
or within its industry. The staff comment letters themselves will generate infor-
mation about an issuer’s evaluation of sustainability issues and the risks they 
present. And issuers will learn from and be able to emulate the disclosures made 
by their peers. 
C. SD&A WILL IMPROVE SUSTAINABILITY DISCLOSURE RELIABILITY 
Finally, SD&A will improve the reliability of sustainability disclosure over the 
current system. Here is arguably where this Article’s proposal has the most to 
offer. First, it is important to recognize the substantial methodological impact of 
integrating sustainability disclosure into traditional securities reporting. Under 
this proposal, sustainability disclosures will be prepared by disclosure attorneys 
rather than marketing personnel and subjected to the same verification require-
ments as traditional financial disclosures.240 
Furthermore, the SD&A proposal will lead to the board of directors being ac-
countable for sustainability disclosures in a way in that they are not in the current 
system. The board’s role in overseeing and certifying the sustainability disclo-
sures will require that they set up reporting systems to receive information about 
the issues addressed in the SD&A and their impact on operations. This reporting 
process will both improve the reliability of the disclosures and provide the board 
with a greater role in overseeing and understanding the issuer’s sustainability 
practices. In addition, it will enable the board to incorporate sustainability consid-
erations into its analysis of strategic issues and operational risk management. By 
contrast, in the current system, the degree of board oversight of sustainability 
issues is unclear, and there is no direct link between the board or even high-level 
executives and the choice of issues addressed in an issuer’s sustainability reports. 
Even if some firms make high-quality sustainability disclosures under the vol-
untary system, a mandatory system is likely to improve the quality of sustainabil-
ity disclosure more broadly. In an analogous examination of the shift from 
voluntary to mandatory disclosure of risk factors, Nelson and Pritchard found 
that, although those firms facing significant litigation risk made substantial dis-
closures under a voluntary regime, mandatory disclosure improved the quality of 
disclosure for other firms.241 
The value of mandatory disclosure in ensuring quality disclosure depends crit-
ically on its enforcement; the risk of liability for noncompliance is what gives 
teeth to the statutory disclosure provisions. Accordingly, if the goal of the SD&A  
240. For a discussion of the preparation of traditional securities filings, see supra notes 235–39 and 
accompanying text. 
241. See generally Karen K. Nelson & A.C. Pritchard, Carrot or Stick? The Shift from Voluntary to 
Mandatory Disclosure of Risk Factors, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 266, 287–95 (2016) (empirically 
analyzing the effect of mandated disclosure of risk factors). 
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is to improve the reliability of sustainability disclosures, it is necessary to give 
attention not just to the disclosure requirement itself but to the way it is enforced. 
The disclosure requirements of Regulation S–K do not themselves “create[] an 
independent private right of action.”242 Thus, an issuer’s failure to disclose a 
known trend in violation of Item 303 can only be enforced by the SEC.243 On the 
other hand, the federal courts have universally recognized a private right of action 
for federal securities fraud under Rule 10b-5.244 Accordingly, to the extent that an 
issuer makes an affirmatively false disclosure, that conduct is arguably actionable 
through private litigation. Courts have typically held both that Regulation S–K 
creates an affirmative obligation to disclose and that failure to comply with that 
requirement can provide the basis for a private securities fraud suit.245 
As a result, inclusion of SD&A within securities filings would subject issuers’ 
sustainability disclosures to SEC oversight and enforcement and clarify that 
fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions are actionable as securities fraud. 
Notably, the structure of the SD&A proposal increases the likely reliability of the 
disclosure by making the issuer’s affirmative disclosure requirement explicit.246 
There is ongoing debate about the extent to which all material omissions under Item 303 are 
actionable as securities fraud, centered on the question of whether the materiality standard for Item 303 
is lower than that under Basic Inc. v. Levinson. See, e.g., Oran, 226 F.3d at 288 (“[A] violation of 
SK–303’s reporting requirements does not automatically give rise to a material omission under Rule 
10b–5.”); see also Matthew C. Turk & Karen E. Woody, Leidos and the Roberts Court’s Improvident 
Securities Law Docket, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 89, 92 (2017), https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp- 
content/uploads/sites/3/2017/11/70-Stan.-L.-Rev.-Online-89-Turk-and-Woody.pdf (“A consequence of 
the slightly lower materiality threshold for Item 303 is that it reduces the range of claims that private 
investors may bring based on firms’ incomplete disclosure of required MD&A information.”). 
The Supreme Court was positioned to address this question when it granted certiorari in Leidos last 
year. Leidos, Inc. v. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. 1395 (2017), but that case was settled before oral 
argument, Turk & Woody, supra, at 89. 
Issuers cannot greenwash their SD&As to avoid addressing issues likely to cause 
the market concern247 because, to the extent those issues are potentially among 
the three most significant, an issuer’s decision to omit them would constitute not 
just an omission but a fraudulent misrepresentation—a representation that the 
omitted issue is not among the three most significant. 
242. Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 287 (3d Cir. 2000). 
243. Cf. id. 
244. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. 
REV. 811, 815 (2009) (“The federal courts have recognized an implied private right of action under 
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5, and have used federal common law to 
define the contours of the cause of action.” (footnotes omitted)). 
245. See, e.g., Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys. v. SAIC, Inc., 818 F.3d 85, 94 n.7 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Item 303 
imposes an ‘affirmative duty to disclose . . . [that] can serve as the basis for a securities fraud claim 
under Section 10(b).’” (quoting Stratte–McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(alteration in original))). 
246. 
247. The SD&A requirement is therefore more constraining than the risk-factor disclosure 
requirement. Cf. Edward A. Morse, Vasant Raval & John R. Wingender, Jr., SEC Cybersecurity 
Guidelines: Insights into the Utility of Risk Factor Disclosures for Investors, 73 BUS. LAW. 1, 20–21 
(2017–2018) (finding that most issuers failed to disclose cybersecurity risks after the SEC’s release of 
new guidelines and that the market apparently viewed disclosing such risk as a negative signal). 
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This Article contemplates that implementation and enforcement of the SD&A 
would take place primarily through SEC oversight and, when appropriate, 
enforcement action. As described, because of the review process, the SEC staff 
would be well-positioned to identify critical weaknesses in an issuer’s MD&A— 
by allowing the staff to ask Exxon, for example, why it has failed to address cli-
mate change in its SD&A considering disclosures by peer firms like Occidental 
Petroleum and BP. 
There are advantages to relying on the SEC to undertake most SD&A enforce-
ment. First, the SEC may have greater expertise, enabling it to choose more accu-
rately the cases in which enforcement is most consistent with the purposes of 
federal regulation.248 Second, public enforcement may be more efficient.249 
Third, public enforcement is unlikely to be affected by the incentives that have 
the potential to produce abusive and excessive litigation, such as the high fees 
that plaintiffs’ attorneys can recover.250 Thus, for example, private litigants have 
rarely targeted individual defendants because of their lack of “deep pockets”; but 
the prospect of SEC enforcement is likely to focus corporate directors’ attention 
on ensuring the accuracy of their sustainability disclosures.251 
ee Bradley Bondi, A Brief History of SEC Enforcement Actions Against Directors, LAW360 
(Oct. 16, 2015, 1:59 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/714967/a-brief-history-of-sec-enforcement- 
actions-against-directors [https://perma.cc/HGA5-77JD] (“Though rare, enforcement actions against 
directors are a key component of the SEC’s targeting of misconduct by ‘gatekeepers’ . . . .”). A relatively 
small number of SEC actions involving individual directors can be effective in increasing directors’ 
attention to their oversight responsibilities. See, e.g., SEC Sharpens Focus on Disclosure of 
Executive Perks, SHEPPARD MULLIN: CORP. & SEC. LAW BLOG (June 22, 2005), https://www. 
corporatesecuritieslawblog.com/2005/06/sec-sharpens-focus-on-disclosure-of-executive-perks/ [https:// 
perma.cc/R2YZ-PY3U] (advising that one message from SEC’s enforcement actions against Tyson 
Foods and GE is that members of compensation committees face “personal liability for inaccurate or 
incomplete [compensation] disclosure[s]”). 
Finally, the govern-
ment can often send a message by bringing a limited number of high-profile 
cases, such as the SEC’s enforcement action against Caterpillar.252 
There are problems, however, with limiting enforcement to the SEC. A variety 
of courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, commentators, and the SEC itself, 
have acknowledged the valuable role that private efforts play in supplementing  
248. See, e.g., James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the Securities Laws, 
100 CALIF. L. REV. 115, 124 (2012) (describing the argument that public enforcement may be premised 
on “the idea that the SEC is a better securities enforcer than private parties because of its expertise with 
respect to the securities laws”); see also Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action 
Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission’s Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1023–24 
(1994) (suggesting, in light of these considerations, that the SEC eliminate private litigation as a means 
to enforce Rule 10b-5). 
249. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market, 
160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 118 (2011) (advocating “stepped-up SEC enforcement capability as a cost- 
effective substitute” for private litigation). 
250. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 533, 535–36 (1997) (describing potential of incentives such as multi-million-dollar fee awards, to 
produce abusive litigation). 
251. S
252. In re Caterpillar, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 30,532, [1992 Transfer Binder] 7 Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 73,830 (Mar. 31, 1992). 
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public enforcement.253 The government may have limited resources available to 
address wrongdoing. In addition, SEC enforcement efforts are vulnerable to both 
political pressures and shifting administrative priorities.254 The risk of underen-
forcement is illustrated by the SEC’s limited track record with respect to MD&A 
disclosure; it has brought less than one hundred enforcement cases alleging viola-
tions since Regulation S–K’s adoption.255 
Accordingly, private enforcement is likely to serve as a valuable supplement to 
public enforcement. Although concerns have been raised about the potential for 
excessive or burdensome securities fraud litigation,256 that risk is likely to be 
especially limited under the SD&A proposal. There are three reasons for this. 
First, the SD&A requirement is explicit and limited—issuers are only required to 
disclose the three most significant sustainability issues. As a result, the require-
ment does not open the door to efforts to characterize additional sustainability 
issues as fraudulent omissions. Second, to succeed in a securities fraud lawsuit, 
private litigants must establish loss causation and damages, meaning that they 
must show that the issuer’s misrepresentation or omission had an economic 
impact on the value of their shares.257 As interpreted by the courts, the loss causa-
tion requirement requires affirmative proof that the fraud impacted stock price.258 
Thus, only the most economically significant of sustainability disclosure-related 
failures could trigger private litigation.259 
Because the relative significance of sustainability issues can change over time, it may be 
worthwhile for the SEC to consider a safe harbor providing that, under appropriate circumstances, an 
issuer’s identification of a new sustainability issue does not subject it to liability for previously failing to 
discuss that issue. See, e.g., BARBARA NOVICK ET AL., BLACKROCK, EXPLORING ESG: A PRACTITIONER’S 
PERSPECTIVE 9 (2016), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-exploring- 
Third, to bring a securities fraud suit, a 
253. See, e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007) (“[P]rivate 
actions . . . are an essential supplement to criminal prosecutions and civil enforcement actions brought, 
respectively, by the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).”); 
James D. Cox et al., SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 738 (2003) 
(“Since the inception of the federal securities laws, the government’s broad enforcement authority has 
been complemented by private causes of action.”); see also A.C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: Time for 
Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073, 1085 (2005) (“With a few minor exceptions . . . the SEC 
has sided with the plaintiffs’ bar in the courts.”). 
254. See Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A Look Ahead at 
the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. REG. 149, 279 (1990) (“[A]ny projection of future SEC enforcement trends 
is highly dependent upon the accuracy of prognostications about the prevailing political climate.”). 
These concerns can be mitigated if public enforcement by multiple regulators is possible. See, e.g., 
John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 
VA. L. REV. 707, 763 (2009) (“[S]tate Attorneys General have played an aggressive role in prosecuting 
securities fraud and have pushed the SEC to be more vigorous in its own enforcement efforts.”). 
255. Leidos Amicus Brief, supra note 214, at 26–27. 
256. This risk is potentially heightened with respect to sustainability disclosure due to uncertainty 
about issues such as the definition of sustainability, the determination of economic materiality, and the 
difficulty for even a well-intentioned issuer in evaluating the economic impact of a known risk or trend. 
See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 179, at 970–71 (discussing the difficulty of determining the extent of 
the duty to disclose disaster-related risks). 
257. Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion After Halliburton, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 
895, 914–16 (2013) (describing the Supreme Court’s articulation of the loss causation requirement in 
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005)). 
258. See id. at 915 (terming this “‘ex post’ price distortion”). 
259. 
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esg-a-practitioners-perspective-june-2016.pdf (proposing “safe harbor provisions that ensure that 
companies which initiate ESG factor reporting do not face retrospective litigation”). 
260. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 735–36 (1975). 
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private litigant must be a purchaser or seller of the securities.260 As a result, pri-
vate litigation could not be used by environmental groups or other non-share-
holder stakeholders to promote noneconomic objectives. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the growing quantity of corporate sustainability disclosures, the exist-
ing disclosure system is fragmented, unreliable, and incomplete. In light of the 
worldwide debate over sustainability practices and investor claims regarding the 
necessity of quality sustainability disclosures for an adequate evaluation of issuer 
operations, it is necessary for the SEC to reverse its position that sustainability 
disclosure is not properly included within financial reporting. This Article pro-
poses that the SEC adopt a principles-based disclosure approach through a narra-
tive sustainability disclosure and analysis reporting requirement. It argues that 
the SD&A is a cost-justified approach that is well-suited to improve the availabil-
ity of corporate sustainability information for investors, and that SD&A quality 
can be enhanced by a liability and enforcement structure with direct incentives 
for board involvement and oversight. 
It is too early to determine the extent to which sustainable business practices 
impact economic performance, or the degree to which boards that engage with 
sustainability can exercise better risk management and monitoring. SD&A dis-
closure represents a valuable first step that would enable investors and researchers 
to weigh those questions with minimal burden on corporate issuers.  
